國立虎尾科技大學 |

Information Acquisition and Revelation in the Financial Markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Information Acquisition and Revelation in the Financial Markets./
作者:	Chu, Yinxiao.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (174 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International80-01A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780438351196

Information Acquisition and Revelation in the Financial Markets.
Chu, Yinxiao.

Information Acquisition and Revelation in the Financial Markets. - 1 online resource (174 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2018.

Includes bibliographical references

Information plays an important role in financial markets. In this dissertation, first, we consider how traders choose different information. Second, we ask when traders acquire information under competition. Finally, we analyze how ambiguous information affects traders' incentives to trade and reveal their private information.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780438351196Subjects--Topical Terms:

555568
Economics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Information Acquisition and Revelation in the Financial Markets.
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100 1 $a Chu, Yinxiao. $3 1193546
245 1 0 $a Information Acquisition and Revelation in the Financial Markets.
264 0 $c 2018
300 $a 1 online resource (174 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
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338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Jan Werner; David Masiur Rahman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2018.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Information plays an important role in financial markets. In this dissertation, first, we consider how traders choose different information. Second, we ask when traders acquire information under competition. Finally, we analyze how ambiguous information affects traders' incentives to trade and reveal their private information.
520 $a There is information not only about the payoff but also concerning the supply and demand of an asset. In Chapter 1, we study how traders choose to process different information while asset prices are conveying some information. We show that traders decide to process different types of information depends on their initial belief and the informativeness of asset prices. In particular, when the return to each type of information is increasing, traders choose to learn only one type of information. Those who have more precise initial belief about the asset payoff (supply) choose to learn more about the asset payoff (supply).
520 $a In Chapter 2, we study when traders decide to acquire information under competition. Traders consider two effects of competition in information acquisition: one is that an informed trader's profitability is affected by the presence of another informed trader, the other is the spillover of the information from the informed trader to the uninformed. We show that, when the former effect dominates, then traders tend to acquire information earlier. If the otherwise, then traders tend to delay their information acquisition.
520 $a In Chapter 3, we study traders' behavior when information is ambiguous, which gives rise to multiple probability models to describe uncertainty. We demonstrate that ambiguity will reduce traders' incentive to trade and reveal their private information. When there is a moderate level of ambiguity, informed traders start to trade randomly, whereas they trade for sure when there is no or a little uncertainty. When ambiguity is sufficiently large, informed traders choose not to trade any more, and no additional information will be revealed in the market.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
650 4 $a Finance. $3 559073
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0508
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710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of Minnesota. $b Economics. $3 1179201
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 80-01A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10829675 $z click for full text (PQDT)