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Disclosure of Awareness and Information : = Theory and Experiment.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Disclosure of Awareness and Information :/
其他題名:	Theory and Experiment.
作者:	Li, Yingxue.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (138 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-05A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355461954

Disclosure of Awareness and Information : = Theory and Experiment.
Li, Yingxue.

Disclosure of Awareness and Information :Theory and Experiment. - 1 online resource (138 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation consists of three chapters and each chapter focuses on a certain aspect related to the disclosure of awareness and information in games.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355461954Subjects--Topical Terms:

555568
Economics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Disclosure of Awareness and Information : = Theory and Experiment.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Burkhard C. Schipper.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation consists of three chapters and each chapter focuses on a certain aspect related to the disclosure of awareness and information in games.
520 $a In Chapter 1, we study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or iterated admissibility predict unraveling of information. Iterative admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. Overall we observe behavior consistent with relatively high levels of reasoning. While iterative admissibility implies that the level of reasoning required for unraveling is increasing in the number of quality levels, we find only insignificant more unraveling in a game with two quality levels compared to a game with four quality levels. There is weak evidence for learning higher-level reasoning in later rounds of the experiments. Participants have problems to transfer learning to unravel in a game with two quality levels to a game with four quality levels. Finally, participants who score higher on cognitive abilities in Raven's progressive matrices test also display significantly higher levels of reasoning in our persuasion games.
520 $a In Chapter 2, we consider a persuasion game between a seller and a buyer. The seller has a good whose quality is known to him but not to the buyer. Before the buyer decides on how many units to buy, the seller can disclose some verifiable information to the buyer. The "better" the information, the more the buyer will buy. The information is two-dimensional. There are two treatments. In the unawareness treatment, the buyer is unaware of the second dimension. In the control treatment, the buyer is aware of both dimensions. Theory predicts unraveling in the control treatment but not the unawareness treatment. We test this prediction experimentally.
520 $a In Chapter 3, we study auctioning access to online users when vast amounts of information are collected about online users but the disclosure of such information to bidders is restricted for privacy concerns. The valuation of bidders for users depends on the information that is disclosed by the seller for a fee or kept secret. There are two kinds of information: First, the seller can make bidders aware of variables on which it collects data about users. Second, the seller can allow the bidder to learn information about the value of those variables. We characterize bidders willingness to pay for information and the seller's expected revenue from sale via a second-price auction and fees. We show that if access to users is allocated by second-price auctions, then in absence of privacy concerns it is optimal for the seller to disclose all information to bidders. Under privacy concerns for some types of data, it is optimal for the seller to make bidders aware of a variable if its expected value is positive. That is, if the seller does not make a bidder aware of some type of data that it collects, then the expected value from these type of data must be unfavorable to the bidder. We show by the example that the converse is not true.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Economics. $3 555568
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a University of California, Davis. $b Economics. $3 1179194
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-05A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10623545 $z click for full text (PQDT)