國立虎尾科技大學 |

Analysis and Automated Discovery of Attacks in Transport Protocols.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Analysis and Automated Discovery of Attacks in Transport Protocols./
作者:	Jero, Samuel C.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (171 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-12B(E).
標題:	Computer science. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780438153813

Analysis and Automated Discovery of Attacks in Transport Protocols.
Jero, Samuel C.

Analysis and Automated Discovery of Attacks in Transport Protocols. - 1 online resource (171 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Purdue University, 2018.

Includes bibliographical references

Transport protocols like TCP and QUIC are a crucial component of today's Internet, underlying services as diverse as email, file transfer, web browsing, video conferencing, and instant messaging as well as infrastructure protocols like BGP and secure network protocols like TLS. Transport protocols provide a variety of important guarantees like reliability, in-order delivery, and congestion control to applications. As a result, the design and implementation of transport protocols is complex, with many components, special cases, interacting features, and efficiency considerations, leading to a high probability of bugs. Unfortunately, today the testing of transport protocols is mainly a manual, ad-hoc process. This lack of systematic testing has resulted in a steady stream of attacks compromising the availability, performance, or security of transport protocols, as seen in the literature.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780438153813Subjects--Topical Terms:

573171
Computer science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Analysis and Automated Discovery of Attacks in Transport Protocols.
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245 1 0 $a Analysis and Automated Discovery of Attacks in Transport Protocols.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: B.
500 $a Advisers: Cristina Nita-Rotaru; Sonia Fahmy.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Purdue University, 2018.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Transport protocols like TCP and QUIC are a crucial component of today's Internet, underlying services as diverse as email, file transfer, web browsing, video conferencing, and instant messaging as well as infrastructure protocols like BGP and secure network protocols like TLS. Transport protocols provide a variety of important guarantees like reliability, in-order delivery, and congestion control to applications. As a result, the design and implementation of transport protocols is complex, with many components, special cases, interacting features, and efficiency considerations, leading to a high probability of bugs. Unfortunately, today the testing of transport protocols is mainly a manual, ad-hoc process. This lack of systematic testing has resulted in a steady stream of attacks compromising the availability, performance, or security of transport protocols, as seen in the literature.
520 $a Given the importance of these protocols, we believe that there is a need for the development of automated systems to identify complex attacks in implementations of these protocols and for a better understanding of the types of attacks that will be faced by next generation transport protocols. In this dissertation, we focus on improving this situation, and the security of transport protocols, in three ways. First, we develop a system to automatically search for attacks that target the availability or performance of protocol connections on real transport protocol implementations. Second, we implement a model-based system to search for attacks against implementations of TCP congestion control. Finally, we examine QUIC, Google's next generation encrypted transport protocol, and identify attacks on availability and performance.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Computer science. $3 573171
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0984
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Purdue University. $b Computer Sciences. $3 1179390
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-12B(E).
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