語系:
繁體中文
English
說明(常見問題)
登入
回首頁
切換:
標籤
|
MARC模式
|
ISBD
From Attack to Defense : = Toward Se...
~
Cho, Kyong Tak.
From Attack to Defense : = Toward Secure In-vehicle Networks.
紀錄類型:
書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
From Attack to Defense :/
其他題名:
Toward Secure In-vehicle Networks.
作者:
Cho, Kyong Tak.
面頁冊數:
1 online resource (190 pages)
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: B.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International79-12B(E).
標題:
Computer science. -
電子資源:
click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:
9780438127128
From Attack to Defense : = Toward Secure In-vehicle Networks.
Cho, Kyong Tak.
From Attack to Defense :
Toward Secure In-vehicle Networks. - 1 online resource (190 pages)
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: B.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2018.
Includes bibliographical references
New security breaches in vehicles are emerging due to software-driven Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivity of modern vehicles. These trends have introduced more remote surfaces/endpoints that an adversary can exploit and, in the worst case, use to control the vehicle remotely. Researchers have demonstrated how vulnerabilities in remote endpoints can be exploited to compromise ECUs, access in-vehicle networks, and control vehicle maneuvers. To detect and prevent such vehicle cyber attacks, researchers have also developed and proposed numerous countermeasures (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems and message authentication schemes). However, there still remain potentially critical attacks that existing defense schemes can neither detect/prevent nor consider. Moreover, existing defense schemes lack certain functionalities (e.g., identifying the message transmitter), thus not providing strong protection for safety-critical ECUs against in-vehicle network attacks. With all such unexplored and unresolved security issues, vehicles and drivers/passengers will remain insecure.
Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018
Mode of access: World Wide Web
ISBN: 9780438127128Subjects--Topical Terms:
573171
Computer science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:
554714
Electronic books.
From Attack to Defense : = Toward Secure In-vehicle Networks.
LDR
:04367ntm a2200349Ki 4500
001
919227
005
20181116131022.5
006
m o u
007
cr mn||||a|a||
008
190606s2018 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020
$a
9780438127128
035
$a
(MiAaPQ)AAI10903106
035
$a
(MiAaPQ)umichrackham:001290
035
$a
AAI10903106
040
$a
MiAaPQ
$b
eng
$c
MiAaPQ
$d
NTU
100
1
$a
Cho, Kyong Tak.
$3
1193746
245
1 0
$a
From Attack to Defense :
$b
Toward Secure In-vehicle Networks.
264
0
$c
2018
300
$a
1 online resource (190 pages)
336
$a
text
$b
txt
$2
rdacontent
337
$a
computer
$b
c
$2
rdamedia
338
$a
online resource
$b
cr
$2
rdacarrier
500
$a
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: B.
500
$a
Adviser: Kang Geun Shin.
502
$a
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2018.
504
$a
Includes bibliographical references
520
$a
New security breaches in vehicles are emerging due to software-driven Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and wireless connectivity of modern vehicles. These trends have introduced more remote surfaces/endpoints that an adversary can exploit and, in the worst case, use to control the vehicle remotely. Researchers have demonstrated how vulnerabilities in remote endpoints can be exploited to compromise ECUs, access in-vehicle networks, and control vehicle maneuvers. To detect and prevent such vehicle cyber attacks, researchers have also developed and proposed numerous countermeasures (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems and message authentication schemes). However, there still remain potentially critical attacks that existing defense schemes can neither detect/prevent nor consider. Moreover, existing defense schemes lack certain functionalities (e.g., identifying the message transmitter), thus not providing strong protection for safety-critical ECUs against in-vehicle network attacks. With all such unexplored and unresolved security issues, vehicles and drivers/passengers will remain insecure.
520
$a
This dissertation aims to fill this gap by 1) unveiling a new important and critical vulnerability applicable to several in-vehicle networks (including the Controller Area Network (CAN), the de-facto standard protocol), 2) proposing a new Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which can detect not only those attacks that have already been demonstrated or discussed in literature, but also those that are more acute and cannot be detected by state-of-the-art IDSes, 3) designing an attacker identification scheme that provides a swift pathway for forensic, isolation, security patch, etc., and 4) investigating what an adversary can achieve while the vehicle's ignition is off..
520
$a
First, we unveil a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack called the bus-off attack that, ironically, exploits the error-handling scheme of in-vehicle networks. That is, their fault-confinement mechanism --- which has been considered as one of their major advantages in providing fault-tolerance and robustness --- is used as an attack vector. Next, we propose a new anomaly-based IDS that detects intrusions based on the extracted fingerprints of ECUs. Such a capability overcomes the deficiency of existing IDSes and thus detects a wide range of in-vehicle network attacks, including those existing schemes cannot. Then, we propose an attacker identification scheme that provides a swift pathway for forensic, isolation, and security patch. This is achieved by fingerprinting ECUs based on CAN voltage measurements. It takes advantage of the fact that voltage outputs of each ECU are slightly different from each other due to their differences in supply voltage, ground voltage, resistance values, etc. Lastly, we propose two new attack methods called the Battery-Drain and the Denial-of-Body-control attacks through which an adversary can disable parked vehicles with the ignition off. These attacks invalidate the conventional belief that vehicle cyber attacks are feasible and thus their defenses are required only when the vehicles ignition is on.
533
$a
Electronic reproduction.
$b
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
$c
ProQuest,
$d
2018
538
$a
Mode of access: World Wide Web
650
4
$a
Computer science.
$3
573171
655
7
$a
Electronic books.
$2
local
$3
554714
690
$a
0984
710
2
$a
ProQuest Information and Learning Co.
$3
1178819
710
2
$a
University of Michigan.
$b
Computer Science and Engineering.
$3
1181870
773
0
$t
Dissertation Abstracts International
$g
79-12B(E).
856
4 0
$u
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10903106
$z
click for full text (PQDT)
筆 0 讀者評論
多媒體
評論
新增評論
分享你的心得
Export
取書館別
處理中
...
變更密碼[密碼必須為2種組合(英文和數字)及長度為10碼以上]
登入