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Epistemic Democracy and Republican Freedom.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Epistemic Democracy and Republican Freedom./
Author:	Zavediuk, Nicholas.
Description:	1 online resource (214 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-04A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781369193381

Epistemic Democracy and Republican Freedom.
Zavediuk, Nicholas.

Epistemic Democracy and Republican Freedom. - 1 online resource (214 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Saint Louis University, 2016.

Includes bibliographical references

Epistemic theories of democracy claim that democracies are more capable of making wiser public policy decisions than alternative forms of political order. Many of these theories make reference to the argument that the inclusive nature of democratic institutions give them the ability to better generate and pool knowledge that is widely distributed in society, while also providing policy-makers with greater access to the interests and values of citizens. A controversial feature of defending democracy on epistemic grounds is that by providing a purely instrumental justification of democracy's moral value, these theories cannot adequately explain the value of many non-instrumental consideration invoked in defense of democratic institutions (such as equality, autonomy, or self-determination). In this essay, I argue that the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination furnishes a distinctive non-instrumental justification of democracy's epistemic value. Republicanism defines domination as a condition in which one person is vulnerable to the arbitrary will of another. The essay offers a novel interpretation of the analogy between democratic regimes and the jury system, focusing on how both contexts create a specifically epistemic dependence on the judgment of others. This dependence creates an asymmetry of power in judgment between otherwise equal citizens. I label these circumstances of potential domination by the judgment of others, rather than in their will or action, as 'doxastic domination.' The distinctiveness of doxastic domination is established by arguing that there is an inherently epistemic limiting constraint on the electoral and contestatory features of politics that republicanism associates with the domination-minimizing capabilities of democracy. The essay also argues that institutional arrangements are most effective in minimizing doxastic domination when they are based on debunking norms rather than norms of depolitcization or impartiality. The essay concludes by arguing that an attractive feature of the republican justification of epistemic democracy is that it assigns a plausible epistemic function to direct political action the public sphere, insofar as methods of protest and social disturbance can help marginalized groups overcome doxastic domination and thereby allow their knowledge and perspectives to receive the political uptake necessary for wise public policy-making.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781369193381Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Epistemic Democracy and Republican Freedom.
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520 $a Epistemic theories of democracy claim that democracies are more capable of making wiser public policy decisions than alternative forms of political order. Many of these theories make reference to the argument that the inclusive nature of democratic institutions give them the ability to better generate and pool knowledge that is widely distributed in society, while also providing policy-makers with greater access to the interests and values of citizens. A controversial feature of defending democracy on epistemic grounds is that by providing a purely instrumental justification of democracy's moral value, these theories cannot adequately explain the value of many non-instrumental consideration invoked in defense of democratic institutions (such as equality, autonomy, or self-determination). In this essay, I argue that the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination furnishes a distinctive non-instrumental justification of democracy's epistemic value. Republicanism defines domination as a condition in which one person is vulnerable to the arbitrary will of another. The essay offers a novel interpretation of the analogy between democratic regimes and the jury system, focusing on how both contexts create a specifically epistemic dependence on the judgment of others. This dependence creates an asymmetry of power in judgment between otherwise equal citizens. I label these circumstances of potential domination by the judgment of others, rather than in their will or action, as 'doxastic domination.' The distinctiveness of doxastic domination is established by arguing that there is an inherently epistemic limiting constraint on the electoral and contestatory features of politics that republicanism associates with the domination-minimizing capabilities of democracy. The essay also argues that institutional arrangements are most effective in minimizing doxastic domination when they are based on debunking norms rather than norms of depolitcization or impartiality. The essay concludes by arguing that an attractive feature of the republican justification of epistemic democracy is that it assigns a plausible epistemic function to direct political action the public sphere, insofar as methods of protest and social disturbance can help marginalized groups overcome doxastic domination and thereby allow their knowledge and perspectives to receive the political uptake necessary for wise public policy-making.
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