國立虎尾科技大學 |

CEO Network Centrality and Earnings Quality.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	CEO Network Centrality and Earnings Quality./
作者:	Song, Xuehu.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (106 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-09A(E).
標題:	Accounting. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355856934

CEO Network Centrality and Earnings Quality.
Song, Xuehu.

CEO Network Centrality and Earnings Quality. - 1 online resource (106 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Oklahoma State University, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) social connectedness and earnings quality, specifically discretionary accruals, accruals quality, and the likelihood of restating annual statements. In this study, a CEO's social network is established through her connections via the board of directors in her firm and connections via her board positions in other firms. CEO social connectedness is proxied by four network centrality measures: degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. These measures collectively identify the strength and extent of a CEO's connectedness in the network. Well-connected CEOs may have a significant number of useful contacts and can reach other board directors in the network easily and quickly. As a result, they can access more information and resources, which may help them implement more efficient internal controls, adopt better accounting practices, and make more reliable accounting estimates to improve earnings quality. On the other hand, social connectedness is also a source of influence and power. According to agency theory, well-connected CEOs may use their power to pressure their chief financial officers (CFOs) for biased financial reports, which could lower earnings quality. I find evidence that firms with well-connected CEOs are associated with larger absolute discretional accruals and poor accruals quality. The results of this study will contribute to the literature on earnings quality and social networks and also inform corporate stakeholders about potential financial reporting consequences when a firm has a CEO with strong social connections.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355856934Subjects--Topical Terms:

561166
Accounting.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

CEO Network Centrality and Earnings Quality.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Sandeep Nabar.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Oklahoma State University, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) social connectedness and earnings quality, specifically discretionary accruals, accruals quality, and the likelihood of restating annual statements. In this study, a CEO's social network is established through her connections via the board of directors in her firm and connections via her board positions in other firms. CEO social connectedness is proxied by four network centrality measures: degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. These measures collectively identify the strength and extent of a CEO's connectedness in the network. Well-connected CEOs may have a significant number of useful contacts and can reach other board directors in the network easily and quickly. As a result, they can access more information and resources, which may help them implement more efficient internal controls, adopt better accounting practices, and make more reliable accounting estimates to improve earnings quality. On the other hand, social connectedness is also a source of influence and power. According to agency theory, well-connected CEOs may use their power to pressure their chief financial officers (CFOs) for biased financial reports, which could lower earnings quality. I find evidence that firms with well-connected CEOs are associated with larger absolute discretional accruals and poor accruals quality. The results of this study will contribute to the literature on earnings quality and social networks and also inform corporate stakeholders about potential financial reporting consequences when a firm has a CEO with strong social connections.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Accounting. $3 561166
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Oklahoma State University. $b Accounting. $3 1195278
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-09A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10600355 $z click for full text (PQDT)