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The Cost of Refraining from Managing Earnings when an Industry-Leading Peer is Reporting Fraudulently.

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,手稿 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Cost of Refraining from Managing Earnings when an Industry-Leading Peer is Reporting Fraudulently./
作者:	Wood, Justin Paul.
面頁冊數:	1 online resource (82 pages)
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-07A(E).
標題:	Accounting. -
電子資源:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355659160

The Cost of Refraining from Managing Earnings when an Industry-Leading Peer is Reporting Fraudulently.
Wood, Justin Paul.

The Cost of Refraining from Managing Earnings when an Industry-Leading Peer is Reporting Fraudulently. - 1 online resource (82 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

In this study, I explore whether managers and firms are penalized when they face pressures to manage earnings, but chose not to do so. I use periods in which an industry-leading firm inflates earnings fraudulently, and in which the public is unaware of the fraud, as a setting where managers at industry peer firms face pressures to manage earnings. Using the Dechow et al. (2011) F-score, I identify two groups of industry peer firms: one group where firms show no evidence of having managed earnings in response to the industry leader's fraud, and another group where firms do show evidence of having managed earnings in response to the industry leader's fraud. I hypothesize that managers of firms in the first group face a penalty in terms of personal compensation, and that the firms they lead face an increase in the cost of equity, but not in the cost of debt.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355659160Subjects--Topical Terms:

561166
Accounting.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

The Cost of Refraining from Managing Earnings when an Industry-Leading Peer is Reporting Fraudulently.
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245 1 4 $a The Cost of Refraining from Managing Earnings when an Industry-Leading Peer is Reporting Fraudulently.
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300 $a 1 online resource (82 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Daniel W. Collins; Richard D. Mergenthaler.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a In this study, I explore whether managers and firms are penalized when they face pressures to manage earnings, but chose not to do so. I use periods in which an industry-leading firm inflates earnings fraudulently, and in which the public is unaware of the fraud, as a setting where managers at industry peer firms face pressures to manage earnings. Using the Dechow et al. (2011) F-score, I identify two groups of industry peer firms: one group where firms show no evidence of having managed earnings in response to the industry leader's fraud, and another group where firms do show evidence of having managed earnings in response to the industry leader's fraud. I hypothesize that managers of firms in the first group face a penalty in terms of personal compensation, and that the firms they lead face an increase in the cost of equity, but not in the cost of debt.
520 $a I find evidence of a negative association between the decision to refrain from managing earnings and managerial compensation. However, I also observe declining compensation for managers who do manage earnings over the same period. This latter result precludes me from being able to entirely attribute the drop in compensation for the managers of the first group to the decision to refrain from managing earnings. I find that the cost of equity increases in the period of industry-leader fraud for firms that refrain from managing earnings, but the increase is statistically insignificant. The difference in the change in the cost of equity capital for these firms and for those who manage earnings is insignificant. The latter two results preclude me from being able to entirely attribute the increase in the cost of equity for firms in the first group to the decision to refrain from managing earnings. I find no evidence of changes in the cost of debt for firms in either group.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Accounting. $3 561166
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Iowa. $b Business Administration. $3 1179113
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-07A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10607381 $z click for full text (PQDT)