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A copernican critique of Kantian idealism

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A copernican critique of Kantian idealism/ by J.T.W. Ryall.
作者:	Ryall, J.T.W.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2017.,
面頁冊數:	xii, 270 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Philosophy of mind. -
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56771-6
ISBN:	9783319567716

A copernican critique of Kantian idealism
Ryall, J.T.W.

A copernican critique of Kantian idealism[electronic resource] /by J.T.W. Ryall. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017. - xii, 270 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. Introduction -- 2. Reversing Perspectives -- 3. Experience and the Human Object -- 4. Experience and Physical Reality -- 5. Kant's 'Applied Metaphysics' -- 6. Transcending Experience -- 7. The World-Mind Relation -- 8. Making Room for Faith -- 9. Conclusion -- Index.

This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that 'objects conform to our cognition' from the perspective of a Copernican world-view which stands diametrically opposed to Kant's because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kant's ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of 'experience' and 'objectivity', Ryall argues that Kant's transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing that is essential for Copernicus and the only thing that would validate a comparison between his and Kant's critical philosophy, namely the subject as 'revolving object'. It is only by presupposing - in a transcendentally realistic sense - that human beings exist as physical things in themselves, therefore, that the 'observer motion' of Copernican theory is vindicated and the distorted nature of our empirical observations explained. In broadly accessible prose and by directly challenging the arguments of many stalwart defenders of Kant including Norman Kemp Smith, Henry E. Allison and Michael Friedman, Ryall's book will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kant's philosophy alike.

ISBN: 9783319567716

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-56771-6doiSubjects--Personal Names:

800301
Kant, Immanuel,
1724-1804--Ethics.Subjects--Topical Terms:

555804
Philosophy of mind.

LC Class. No.: BD418.3 / .R935 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

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520 $a This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that 'objects conform to our cognition' from the perspective of a Copernican world-view which stands diametrically opposed to Kant's because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kant's ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of 'experience' and 'objectivity', Ryall argues that Kant's transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing that is essential for Copernicus and the only thing that would validate a comparison between his and Kant's critical philosophy, namely the subject as 'revolving object'. It is only by presupposing - in a transcendentally realistic sense - that human beings exist as physical things in themselves, therefore, that the 'observer motion' of Copernican theory is vindicated and the distorted nature of our empirical observations explained. In broadly accessible prose and by directly challenging the arguments of many stalwart defenders of Kant including Norman Kemp Smith, Henry E. Allison and Michael Friedman, Ryall's book will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kant's philosophy alike.
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