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Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative/ edited by Patrizia Pedrini, Julie Kirsch.
其他題名:	3rd person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative
其他作者:	Pedrini, Patrizia.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2018.,
面頁冊數:	xviii, 215 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Self-knowledge, Theory of. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3
ISBN:	9783319986463

Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative
Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative[electronic resource] /3rd person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrativeedited by Patrizia Pedrini, Julie Kirsch. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2018. - xviii, 215 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Contributions to phenomenology,v.960923-9545 ;. - Contributions to phenomenology ;v.67..

This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self- knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, the book focuses on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and makes clear the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. In recent years, the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call 'first person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be 'first-person self-knowledge' is really just 'third-person self-knowledge,' i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge.

ISBN: 9783319986463

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

558727
Self-knowledge, Theory of.

LC Class. No.: BD438.5 / .T45 2018

Dewey Class. No.: 126

Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative
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