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An externalist approach to epistemic responsibility = intellectual norms and their application to epistemic peer disagreement /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	An externalist approach to epistemic responsibility/ by Andrea Robitzsch.
其他題名:	intellectual norms and their application to epistemic peer disagreement /
作者:	Robitzsch, Andrea.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2019.,
面頁冊數:	xiv, 227 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Knowledge, Theory of. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4
ISBN:	9783030190774

An externalist approach to epistemic responsibility = intellectual norms and their application to epistemic peer disagreement /
Robitzsch, Andrea.

An externalist approach to epistemic responsibilityintellectual norms and their application to epistemic peer disagreement /[electronic resource] :by Andrea Robitzsch. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2019. - xiv, 227 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Synthese library ;v.411. - Synthese library ;v.344..

Chapter 1. Doxastic responsibility and direct doxastic control -- Chapter 2. An approach to indirect doxastic responsibility -- Chapter 3. Intellectual norms and epistemic normativity -- Chapter 4. What should we do in the face of epistemic peer disagreement?

This monograph provides a novel reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment. The author presents unique arguments for the epistemic significance of belief-influencing actions and omissions. She grounds her proposal in indirect doxastic control. The book consists of four chapters. The first two chapters look at the different ways in which an agent might control the revision, retention, or rejection of her beliefs. They provide a systematic overview of the different approaches to doxastic control and contain a thorough study of reasons-responsive approaches to direct and indirect doxastic control. The third chapter provides a reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment which is based on indirect doxastic control. In the fourth chapter, the author examines epistemic peer disagreement and applies her reliabilist approach to epistemic responsibility assessment to this debate. She argues that the epistemic significance of peer disagreement does not only rely on the way in which an agent should revise her belief in the face of disagreement, it also relies on the way in which an agent should act. This book deals with questions of meliorative epistemology in general and with questions concerning doxastic responsibility and epistemic responsibility assessment in particular. It will appeal to graduate students and researchers with an interest in epistemology.

ISBN: 9783030190774

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-19077-4doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

554789
Knowledge, Theory of.

LC Class. No.: BD161 / .R635 2019

Dewey Class. No.: 121

An externalist approach to epistemic responsibility = intellectual norms and their application to epistemic peer disagreement /
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