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A science-based critique of epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A science-based critique of epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition/ by Reto Gubelmann.
作者:	Gubelmann, Reto.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2019.,
面頁冊數:	xix, 286 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Knowledge, Theory of. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5
ISBN:	9783030245245

A science-based critique of epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition
Gubelmann, Reto.

A science-based critique of epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition[electronic resource] /by Reto Gubelmann. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2019. - xix, 286 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm.

1. Introduction -- 2. Quine I: The Bold Physicalism of Word and Object -- 3. Quine II: The Evolutionary-Perceptional Account -- 4. Burge: Proto-Predicates in Perceptual Representations -- 5. Maddy: Conceiving Logic as an Innate Cognitive Mechanism -- 6.Quine's Empiricist Justificatory Monism -- 7. Why Justificatory Monism Needs Scientific Realism -- 8. Scientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos' Holistic Approach -- 9. Scientifically Defending Realism II: Maddy's Piecemeal Realism -- 10. Conclusion.

At the intersection of epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of science, this exciting new book examines the epistemic limits of empirical science. It makes a unique contribution to research on epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition by criticizing the position based on first-order data from empirical psychology and the history of natural science. This way, it meets the naturalist on their own ground not only regarding subject matter, but also regarding their epistemic methods. The book explores the works of a variety of philosophers in the field, including W. V. Quine, Penelope Maddy, Tyler Burge, Stathis Psillos and Howard Sankey. By carefully considering experimental results from behaviourism as well as developmental and perceptual psychology, Gubelmann finds that none of these disciplines can furnish the epistemic means to successfully naturalize the central cognitive preconditions of scientific theorizing. Furthermore, Gubelmann presents novel arguments for the claims that epistemological naturalists are committed to scientific realism, and that they are unable to defend this position. Based on these results, Gubelmann concludes that epistemology is not part of empirical science, which directly contradicts epistemological naturalism.

ISBN: 9783030245245

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-24524-5doiSubjects--Personal Names:

808307
Quine, W. V.
Subjects--Topical Terms:

554789
Knowledge, Theory of.

LC Class. No.: BD161 / .G834 2019

Dewey Class. No.: 121

A science-based critique of epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition
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505 0 $a 1. Introduction -- 2. Quine I: The Bold Physicalism of Word and Object -- 3. Quine II: The Evolutionary-Perceptional Account -- 4. Burge: Proto-Predicates in Perceptual Representations -- 5. Maddy: Conceiving Logic as an Innate Cognitive Mechanism -- 6.Quine's Empiricist Justificatory Monism -- 7. Why Justificatory Monism Needs Scientific Realism -- 8. Scientifically Defending Realism I: Psillos' Holistic Approach -- 9. Scientifically Defending Realism II: Maddy's Piecemeal Realism -- 10. Conclusion.
520 $a At the intersection of epistemology, metaphilosophy, and philosophy of science, this exciting new book examines the epistemic limits of empirical science. It makes a unique contribution to research on epistemological naturalism in Quine's tradition by criticizing the position based on first-order data from empirical psychology and the history of natural science. This way, it meets the naturalist on their own ground not only regarding subject matter, but also regarding their epistemic methods. The book explores the works of a variety of philosophers in the field, including W. V. Quine, Penelope Maddy, Tyler Burge, Stathis Psillos and Howard Sankey. By carefully considering experimental results from behaviourism as well as developmental and perceptual psychology, Gubelmann finds that none of these disciplines can furnish the epistemic means to successfully naturalize the central cognitive preconditions of scientific theorizing. Furthermore, Gubelmann presents novel arguments for the claims that epistemological naturalists are committed to scientific realism, and that they are unable to defend this position. Based on these results, Gubelmann concludes that epistemology is not part of empirical science, which directly contradicts epistemological naturalism.
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