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International courts and the performance of international agreements = a general theory with evidence from the European Union /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	International courts and the performance of international agreements/ Clifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel.
其他題名:	a general theory with evidence from the European Union /
其他題名:	International Courts & the Performance of International Agreements
作者:	Carrubba, Clifford J.
其他作者:	Gabel, Matthew J.
出版者:	Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, : 2015.,
面頁冊數:	viii, 243 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
標題:	International courts. -
標題:	European Union countries - Congresses. - Appropriations and expenditures -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107588592
ISBN:	9781107588592

International courts and the performance of international agreements = a general theory with evidence from the European Union /
Carrubba, Clifford J.

International courts and the performance of international agreementsa general theory with evidence from the European Union /[electronic resource] :International Courts & the Performance of International AgreementsClifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel. - Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2015. - viii, 243 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Comparative constitutional law and policy. - Comparative constitutional law and policy..

International courts and compliance --

Nations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.

ISBN: 9781107588592Subjects--Topical Terms:

566296
International courts.
Subjects--Geographical Terms:

557911
European Union countries
--Appropriations and expenditures--Congresses.

LC Class. No.: KZ6250 / .C37 2015

Dewey Class. No.: 341.55

International courts and the performance of international agreements = a general theory with evidence from the European Union /
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