國立虎尾科技大學 |

Modal justification via theories

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Modal justification via theories/ by Bob Fischer.
Author:	Fischer, Bob.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2017.,
Description:	x, 135 p. :ill., digital ; : 24 cm.;
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1
ISBN:	9783319491271

Modal justification via theories
Fischer, Bob.

Modal justification via theories[electronic resource] /by Bob Fischer. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017. - x, 135 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Synthese library ;v.380. - Synthese library ;v.344..

Chapter 1. A Theory-based Epistemology of Modality -- Chapter 2. TEM's Details -- Chapter 3. Objections and Clarifications -- Chapter 4. Theory Selection -- Chapter 5. TEM and Modal Skepticism -- Chapter 6. Against Optimism -- Chapter 7. TEM and the Theoretical Virtues.

This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM) According to TEM, someone justifiably believe an interesting modal claim if and only if (a) she justifiably believes a theory according to which that claim is true, (b) she believes that claim on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief in that claim. The book has two parts. In the first, the author motivates TEM, sets out the view in detail, and defends it against a number of objections. In the second, the author considers whether TEM is worth accepting. To argue that it is, the author sets out criteria for choosing between modal epistemologies, concluding that TEM has a number of important virtues. However, the author also concedes that TEM is cautious: it probably implies that we are not justified in believing some interesting modal claims that we might take ourselves to be justified in believing. This raises a question about TEM's relationship to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author explores in detail. As it turns out, TEM offers a better route to modal skepticism than the one that van Inwagen provides. But rather than being a liability, the author argues that this is a further advantage of the view. Moreover, he argues that other popular modal epistemologies do not fare better: they cannot easily secure more extensive modal justification than TEM. The book concludes by clarifying TEM's relationship to the other modal epistemologies on offer, contending that TEM need not be a rival to those views, but can instead be a supplement to them.

ISBN: 9783319491271

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: B804 / .F57 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 190

Modal justification via theories
LDR:02816nam a2200325 a 4500 001 958131
003 DE-He213
005 20170724115140.0
006 m d
007 cr nn 008maaau
008 201118s2017 gw s 0 eng d
020 $a 9783319491271 $q (electronic bk.)
020 $a 9783319491264 $q (paper)
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-319-49127-1
040 $a GP $c GP
041 0 $a eng
050 4 $a B804 $b .F57 2017
072 7 $a HPK $2 bicssc
072 7 $a PHI004000 $2 bisacsh
082 0 4 $a 190 $2 23
090 $a B804 $b .F529 2017
100 1 $a Fischer, Bob. $3 1249253
245 1 0 $a Modal justification via theories $h [electronic resource] / $c by Bob Fischer.
260 $a Cham : $c 2017. $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer,
300 $a x, 135 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
490 1 $a Synthese library ; $v v.380
505 0 $a Chapter 1. A Theory-based Epistemology of Modality -- Chapter 2. TEM's Details -- Chapter 3. Objections and Clarifications -- Chapter 4. Theory Selection -- Chapter 5. TEM and Modal Skepticism -- Chapter 6. Against Optimism -- Chapter 7. TEM and the Theoretical Virtues.
520 $a This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM) According to TEM, someone justifiably believe an interesting modal claim if and only if (a) she justifiably believes a theory according to which that claim is true, (b) she believes that claim on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief in that claim. The book has two parts. In the first, the author motivates TEM, sets out the view in detail, and defends it against a number of objections. In the second, the author considers whether TEM is worth accepting. To argue that it is, the author sets out criteria for choosing between modal epistemologies, concluding that TEM has a number of important virtues. However, the author also concedes that TEM is cautious: it probably implies that we are not justified in believing some interesting modal claims that we might take ourselves to be justified in believing. This raises a question about TEM's relationship to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author explores in detail. As it turns out, TEM offers a better route to modal skepticism than the one that van Inwagen provides. But rather than being a liability, the author argues that this is a further advantage of the view. Moreover, he argues that other popular modal epistemologies do not fare better: they cannot easily secure more extensive modal justification than TEM. The book concludes by clarifying TEM's relationship to the other modal epistemologies on offer, contending that TEM need not be a rival to those views, but can instead be a supplement to them.
650 0 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
650 0 $a Knowledge, Theory of. $3 554789
650 0 $a Metaphysics. $3 555859
650 0 $a Philosophy and science. $3 555818
650 2 4 $a Epistemology. $3 671538
650 2 4 $a Philosophy of Science. $3 668204
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer eBooks
830 0 $a Synthese library ; $v v.344. $3 881560
856 4 0 $u http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1
950 $a Religion and Philosophy (Springer-41175)