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On the study of human cooperation via computer simulation : = why existing computer models fail to tell us much of anything / Garrison W. Greenwood .

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	On the study of human cooperation via computer simulation :/
Reminder of title:	why existing computer models fail to tell us much of anything / Garrison W. Greenwood .
Author:	Greenwood, Garrison W.,
Description:	1 PDF (xiii, 80 pages) :illustrations (chiefly color). :
Notes:	Part of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.
Subject:	Cooperation - Computer simulation. -
Online resource:	https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?bknumber=8839753
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.2200/S00940ED1V01Y201907GCI004
ISBN:	9781681736358

On the study of human cooperation via computer simulation : = why existing computer models fail to tell us much of anything / Garrison W. Greenwood .
Greenwood, Garrison W.,

On the study of human cooperation via computer simulation :why existing computer models fail to tell us much of anything / Garrison W. Greenwood . - 1 PDF (xiii, 80 pages) :illustrations (chiefly color). - Synthesis lectures on games and computational intelligence,#42573-6493 ;. - Synthesis lectures on games and computational intelligence ;#2..

Part of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 71-76) and index.

1. Social dilemmas -- 2. Prisoner's dilemma and other social dilemma games -- 2.1. Game theory -- 2.2. The prisoner's dilemma game -- 2.3. The public goods game -- 2.4. The snowdrift game

Abstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers.

Compendex

Cooperation is pervasive throughout nature, but its origin remains an open question. For decades, social scientists, business leaders, and economists have struggled with an important question: why is cooperation so ubiquitous among unrelated humans? The answers would have profound effects because anything that promotes cooperation leads to more productive work environments and benefits society at large. Game theory provides an ideal framework for studying social dilemmas, or those situations in which people decide whether to cooperate with others (benefitting the group) or defect by prioritizing their self-interest (benefitting only the individual). The social dilemma is formulated as a mathematical game and then programmed into a computer model. Simulating the game allows researchers to investigate potential theories to explain how cooperation emerges and what promotes its persistence. Over the past 25 years, countless papers on social dilemma games have been published, yet arguably little progress has been made. The problem is the social dilemma game models are unrealistic in the sense they contain artificial constructs that deviate from the way humans act. This book describes the shortcomings in current social dilemma game modeling techniques and provides guidance on designing more effective models. A basic introduction to game theory is provided with an emphasis on the prisoner's dilemma, the most widely studied social dilemma game. Individual chapters are provided detailing the shortcomings of weak selection, spatial games, and the Moran process. Computer model validation is also discussed at length. The recommendations found in this book should help design more realistic social dilemma game models likely to produce a better understanding of human cooperation.

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

ISBN: 9781681736358

Standard No.: 10.2200/S00940ED1V01Y201907GCI004doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1253133
Cooperation
--Computer simulation.Subjects--Index Terms:

human cooperation

LC Class. No.: HB144 / .G746 2019eb

Dewey Class. No.: 300.1/5193

On the study of human cooperation via computer simulation : = why existing computer models fail to tell us much of anything / Garrison W. Greenwood .
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245 1 0 $a On the study of human cooperation via computer simulation : $b why existing computer models fail to tell us much of anything / Garrison W. Greenwood .
264 1 $a [San Rafael, California] : $b Morgan & Claypool, $c [2019]
300 $a 1 PDF (xiii, 80 pages) : $b illustrations (chiefly color).
336 $a text $2 rdacontent
337 $a electronic $2 isbdmedia
338 $a online resource $2 rdacarrier
490 1 $a Synthesis lectures on games and computational intelligence, $x 2573-6493 ; $v #4
500 $a Part of: Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (pages 71-76) and index.
505 0 $a 1. Social dilemmas -- 2. Prisoner's dilemma and other social dilemma games -- 2.1. Game theory -- 2.2. The prisoner's dilemma game -- 2.3. The public goods game -- 2.4. The snowdrift game
505 8 $a 3. Spatial and network games -- 3.1. Spatial games -- 3.2. Network games -- 3.3. Problems with spatial and network games -- 3.4. Summary
505 8 $a 4. The case against weak selection -- 4.1. Summary
505 8 $a 5. The Moran process and replicator dynamics -- 5.1. Depicting strategy evolution -- 5.2. The frequency-dependent Moran process -- 5.3. Replicator equations -- 5.4. Comparing evolutionary mechanisms -- 5.5. Summary
505 8 $a 6. The problems with computer models -- 6.1. Model realism -- 6.2. Model validation -- 6.3. Asking the right questions -- 6.4. Summary
505 8 $a 7. The path forward -- 7.1. The Moran process -- 7.2. Spatial games -- 7.3. Population sizes -- 7.4. Model validation -- 7.5. Summary.
506 $a Abstract freely available; full-text restricted to subscribers or individual document purchasers.
510 0 $a Compendex
510 0 $a INSPEC
510 0 $a Google scholar
510 0 $a Google book search
520 $a Cooperation is pervasive throughout nature, but its origin remains an open question. For decades, social scientists, business leaders, and economists have struggled with an important question: why is cooperation so ubiquitous among unrelated humans? The answers would have profound effects because anything that promotes cooperation leads to more productive work environments and benefits society at large. Game theory provides an ideal framework for studying social dilemmas, or those situations in which people decide whether to cooperate with others (benefitting the group) or defect by prioritizing their self-interest (benefitting only the individual). The social dilemma is formulated as a mathematical game and then programmed into a computer model. Simulating the game allows researchers to investigate potential theories to explain how cooperation emerges and what promotes its persistence. Over the past 25 years, countless papers on social dilemma games have been published, yet arguably little progress has been made. The problem is the social dilemma game models are unrealistic in the sense they contain artificial constructs that deviate from the way humans act. This book describes the shortcomings in current social dilemma game modeling techniques and provides guidance on designing more effective models. A basic introduction to game theory is provided with an emphasis on the prisoner's dilemma, the most widely studied social dilemma game. Individual chapters are provided detailing the shortcomings of weak selection, spatial games, and the Moran process. Computer model validation is also discussed at length. The recommendations found in this book should help design more realistic social dilemma game models likely to produce a better understanding of human cooperation.
530 $a Also available in print.
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web.
538 $a System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
588 $a Title from PDF title page (viewed on September 27, 2019).
650 0 $a Cooperation $x Computer simulation. $3 1253133
650 0 $a Human behavior $x Computer simulation. $3 891827
650 0 $a Game theory. $3 556918
653 $a human cooperation
653 $a game models
653 $a social dilemmas
653 $a prisoner's dilemma
653 $a spatial games
653 $a Moran process
653 $a economic games
776 0 8 $i Print version:
830 0 $a Synthesis lectures on games and computational intelligence ; $v #2. $3 1166800
830 0 $a Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science. $3 598254
856 4 2 $3 Abstract with links to resource $u https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?bknumber=8839753
856 4 0 $3 Abstract with links to full text $u https://doi.org/10.2200/S00940ED1V01Y201907GCI004