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Economic Sanctions vs. Soft Power = Lessons from North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East /
紀錄類型:
書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Economic Sanctions vs. Soft Power/ by N. Anguelov.
其他題名:
Lessons from North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East /
作者:
Anguelov, N.
面頁冊數:
IX, 192 p.online resource. :
Contained By:
Springer Nature eBook
標題:
International relations. -
電子資源:
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137523761
ISBN:
9781137523761
Economic Sanctions vs. Soft Power = Lessons from North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East /
Anguelov, N.
Economic Sanctions vs. Soft Power
Lessons from North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East /[electronic resource] :by N. Anguelov. - 1st ed. 2015. - IX, 192 p.online resource.
The book examines the industrial growth of sanctioned nations in terms of their ability to foster trade partnerships with countries that choose to evade or not comply with sanctions. When those "black knight" nations find strong local market competitive advantages in the absence of firms from sender nations, incentives develop to support local political status quos. For those reasons, the political resilience of rogue and repressive regimes is analyzed in terms of their economic incentives to remain repressive. The resilience is based on the fact that the local politicians are also the local businessmen. Through the growth of international production networks, their business opportunities augment and the rents associated with that growth also increase. As business opportunities grow in the absence of competition, so does the amount of rent extraction and protection. Rent protecting leads to strengthening economic and political leadership, because the wealth is used for creating further rents by providing economic benefits to the regime supporters. Economic Sanctions vs. Soft Power shows how the system of self-enforcing economic rents builds political rents and lowers opportunities for the development of viable political oppositions.
ISBN: 9781137523761
Standard No.: 10.1057/9781137523761doiSubjects--Topical Terms:
554886
International relations.
LC Class. No.: JZ2-6530
Dewey Class. No.: 327
Economic Sanctions vs. Soft Power = Lessons from North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East /
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The book examines the industrial growth of sanctioned nations in terms of their ability to foster trade partnerships with countries that choose to evade or not comply with sanctions. When those "black knight" nations find strong local market competitive advantages in the absence of firms from sender nations, incentives develop to support local political status quos. For those reasons, the political resilience of rogue and repressive regimes is analyzed in terms of their economic incentives to remain repressive. The resilience is based on the fact that the local politicians are also the local businessmen. Through the growth of international production networks, their business opportunities augment and the rents associated with that growth also increase. As business opportunities grow in the absence of competition, so does the amount of rent extraction and protection. Rent protecting leads to strengthening economic and political leadership, because the wealth is used for creating further rents by providing economic benefits to the regime supporters. Economic Sanctions vs. Soft Power shows how the system of self-enforcing economic rents builds political rents and lowers opportunities for the development of viable political oppositions.
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