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Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit/ by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror.
Author:	Zeng, Shuo.
other author:	Dror, Moshe.
Description:	IX, 129 p. 37 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Operations research. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6
ISBN:	9783319186726

Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit
Zeng, Shuo.

Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit[electronic resource] /by Shuo Zeng, Moshe Dror. - 1st ed. 2016. - IX, 129 p. 37 illus.online resource. - SpringerBriefs in Operations Management,2365-8320. - SpringerBriefs in Operations Management,.

Introduction -- The Basic Principal-Agent -- Risk-Neutral Agent -- Risk-Averse Agent -- Risk-Seeking Agent -- Summary.

This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.

ISBN: 9783319186726

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-18672-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

573517
Operations research.

LC Class. No.: HD30.23

Dewey Class. No.: 658.40301

Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit
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