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Fighting Over Peace = Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Fighting Over Peace / by Andrew G. Reiter.
其他題名:	Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence /
作者:	Reiter, Andrew G.
面頁冊數:	XVII, 190 p. 6 illus. in color.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Peace. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40102-7
ISBN:	9783319401027

Fighting Over Peace = Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence /
Reiter, Andrew G.

Fighting Over Peace Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence /[electronic resource] :by Andrew G. Reiter. - 1st ed. 2016. - XVII, 190 p. 6 illus. in color.online resource. - Rethinking Political Violence. - Rethinking Political Violence.

1. Introduction: When Peace Begets Violence -- 2. Who Spoils and Why? -- 3. Where Spoiling Occurs -- 4. Termination Spoiling: Sabotage and Obstruction -- 5. Modification Spoiling: Bargaining and Enforcement -- 6. Conclusion: Implications for Theory and Practice -- Appendix A. Civil War Peace Agreements, 1990-2011 -- Apendix B. Spoilers .

This book presents post-peace agreement violence as a serious, yet predictable and manageable, political phenomenon. Negotiating an end to a civil war is extremely difficult, and many signed peace agreements subsequently unravel, ushering in renewed conflict. In response, important international actors have become increasingly involved in conflict mediation, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction around the globe. Policymakers and scholars alike have identified spoilers—violent actors who often rise up and attempt to challenge or derail the peace process—as one of the greatest threats to peace. Using a mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative analyses of a newly created, global dataset of spoiling, Reiter demonstrates that this type of violence occurs in predictable circumstances and only represents a threat to peace under specific conditions. The book also shows that spoiling often serves to bring agreement flaws and implementation failures to light and in turn forces actors to recommit to an accord, thereby strengthening peace in the long term. .

ISBN: 9783319401027

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-40102-7doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

563174
Peace.

LC Class. No.: JZ5509.2-6300

Dewey Class. No.: 327.172

Fighting Over Peace = Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence /
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