國立虎尾科技大學 |

Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics = Analysis of Traffic Flow and Epidemics /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics/ by Jun Tanimoto.
其他題名:	Analysis of Traffic Flow and Epidemics /
作者:	Tanimoto, Jun.
面頁冊數:	XIV, 221 p. 123 illus., 97 illus. in color.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Evolutionary economics. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8
ISBN:	9789811327698

Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics = Analysis of Traffic Flow and Epidemics /
Tanimoto, Jun.

Evolutionary Games with SociophysicsAnalysis of Traffic Flow and Epidemics /[electronic resource] :by Jun Tanimoto. - 1st ed. 2018. - XIV, 221 p. 123 illus., 97 illus. in color.online resource. - Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science,172198-4204 ;. - Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science,6.

1.Social Physics Approach to Model and Analyze Human – Environmental Social System -- 1.1 Human – Environmental Social System -- 1.2 Evolutionary Game and Social Physics -- 1.3 Structure of This Book -- 2.Evolutionary Game Theory -- 2.1 2-Player & 2-Strategy Games -- 2.2 Multi-player Games -- 2.3 Social Dilemma Alleviated by Integrated Reciprocity Mechanisms -- 3.Social Dilemma Analysis Hidden behind a Traffic Flow -- 3.1 Traffic Flow analysis; Microscopic and Macroscopic Approaches -- 3.2 Social Dilemma in Rote Selection Problem -- 3.3 Social Dilemma Triggered by Vehicle’s Lateral Action; Lane-changing -- 3.4 Social Dilemma in 2-Body Problem of Action and Reaction in a Lane-changing -- 4.Social Dilemma Analysis Observed in Infectious Disease -- 4.1 Classical Model of Macroscopic Epidemiology Model -- 4.2 Microscopic Model Considering Vaccination and Complex Social Network -- 4.3 Evaluation of Imperfect Vaccination and Intermediate Self-protection Measures -- 4.4 Optimum Design of Subsidy Policy for Vaccination.

Recent applications of evolutionary game theory in the merging fields of the mathematical and social sciences are brilliantly portrayed in this book, which highlights social physics and shows how the approach can help to quantitatively model complex human–environmental–social systems. First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas. In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a driver’s decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion. Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while minimizing the social cost. .

ISBN: 9789811327698

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555263
Evolutionary economics.

LC Class. No.: HB97.3

Dewey Class. No.: 330

Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics = Analysis of Traffic Flow and Epidemics /
LDR:04457nam a22003975i 4500 001 989110
003 DE-He213
005 20200703132316.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 201225s2018 si | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9789811327698 $9 978-981-13-2769-8
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8 $2 doi
035 $a 978-981-13-2769-8
050 4 $a HB97.3
072 7 $a KC $2 bicssc
072 7 $a BUS069000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a KC $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 330 $2 23
100 1 $a Tanimoto, Jun. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 1023658
245 1 0 $a Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics $h [electronic resource] : $b Analysis of Traffic Flow and Epidemics / $c by Jun Tanimoto.
250 $a 1st ed. 2018.
264 1 $a Singapore : $b Springer Singapore : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2018.
300 $a XIV, 221 p. 123 illus., 97 illus. in color. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
490 1 $a Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, $x 2198-4204 ; $v 17
505 0 $a 1.Social Physics Approach to Model and Analyze Human – Environmental Social System -- 1.1 Human – Environmental Social System -- 1.2 Evolutionary Game and Social Physics -- 1.3 Structure of This Book -- 2.Evolutionary Game Theory -- 2.1 2-Player & 2-Strategy Games -- 2.2 Multi-player Games -- 2.3 Social Dilemma Alleviated by Integrated Reciprocity Mechanisms -- 3.Social Dilemma Analysis Hidden behind a Traffic Flow -- 3.1 Traffic Flow analysis; Microscopic and Macroscopic Approaches -- 3.2 Social Dilemma in Rote Selection Problem -- 3.3 Social Dilemma Triggered by Vehicle’s Lateral Action; Lane-changing -- 3.4 Social Dilemma in 2-Body Problem of Action and Reaction in a Lane-changing -- 4.Social Dilemma Analysis Observed in Infectious Disease -- 4.1 Classical Model of Macroscopic Epidemiology Model -- 4.2 Microscopic Model Considering Vaccination and Complex Social Network -- 4.3 Evaluation of Imperfect Vaccination and Intermediate Self-protection Measures -- 4.4 Optimum Design of Subsidy Policy for Vaccination.
520 $a Recent applications of evolutionary game theory in the merging fields of the mathematical and social sciences are brilliantly portrayed in this book, which highlights social physics and shows how the approach can help to quantitatively model complex human–environmental–social systems. First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas. In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a driver’s decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion. Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while minimizing the social cost. .
650 0 $a Evolutionary economics. $3 555263
650 0 $a Game theory. $3 556918
650 0 $a Welfare economics. $3 555259
650 0 $a Statistics . $3 1253516
650 0 $a Engineering economics. $3 1253802
650 0 $a Engineering economy. $3 632434
650 1 4 $a Institutional/Evolutionary Economics. $3 1106534
650 2 4 $a Game Theory. $3 1102060
650 2 4 $a Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy. $3 1209828
650 2 4 $a Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. $3 669497
650 2 4 $a Statistics for Business, Management, Economics, Finance, Insurance. $3 1211158
650 2 4 $a Engineering Economics, Organization, Logistics, Marketing. $3 669171
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9789811327681
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9789811327704
830 0 $a Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, $x 2198-4204 ; $v 6 $3 1256339
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8
912 $a ZDB-2-ECF
912 $a ZDB-2-SXEF
950 $a Economics and Finance (SpringerNature-41170)
950 $a Economics and Finance (R0) (SpringerNature-43720)