國立虎尾科技大學 |

Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas/ by Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers.
作者:	Zhang, Laobing.
其他作者:	Reniers, Genserik.
面頁冊數:	XIV, 157 p. 36 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Game theory. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92618-6
ISBN:	9783319926186

Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas
Zhang, Laobing.

Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas[electronic resource] /by Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers. - 1st ed. 2018. - XIV, 157 p. 36 illus.online resource. - Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,1613-5113. - Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications,.

Introduction -- 1. Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: the State of the Art -- 2. Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory -- 3. Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection -- 4. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-free Uncertainties -- 5. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality -- 6. Multi-Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Clusters Patrolling -- 7. Case Studies. 8. Conclusions and Recommendations. .

This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries. The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers. In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike.

ISBN: 9783319926186

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-92618-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

556918
Game theory.

LC Class. No.: HB144

Dewey Class. No.: 519.3

Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas
LDR:03038nam a22004095i 4500 001 991433
003 DE-He213
005 20200702133120.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 201225s2018 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9783319926186 $9 978-3-319-92618-6
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-319-92618-6 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-319-92618-6
050 4 $a HB144
072 7 $a PBUD $2 bicssc
072 7 $a MAT011000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a PBUD $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 519.3 $2 23
100 1 $a Zhang, Laobing. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 1207139
245 1 0 $a Game Theory for Managing Security in Chemical Industrial Areas $h [electronic resource] / $c by Laobing Zhang, Genserik Reniers.
250 $a 1st ed. 2018.
264 1 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2018.
300 $a XIV, 157 p. 36 illus. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
490 1 $a Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, $x 1613-5113
505 0 $a Introduction -- 1. Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: the State of the Art -- 2. Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory -- 3. Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection -- 4. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-free Uncertainties -- 5. Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality -- 6. Multi-Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Clusters Patrolling -- 7. Case Studies. 8. Conclusions and Recommendations. .
520 $a This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries. The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers. In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike.
650 0 $a Game theory. $3 556918
650 0 $a System safety. $3 639363
650 0 $a Chemical engineering. $3 555952
650 0 $a Operations research. $3 573517
650 0 $a Decision making. $3 528319
650 0 $a Mathematical models. $3 527886
650 1 4 $a Game Theory. $3 1102060
650 2 4 $a Security Science and Technology. $3 783419
650 2 4 $a Industrial Chemistry/Chemical Engineering. $3 671153
650 2 4 $a Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. $3 669497
650 2 4 $a Operations Research/Decision Theory. $3 669176
650 2 4 $a Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics. $3 669172
700 1 $a Reniers, Genserik. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 1075882
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783319926179
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783319926193
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030064730
830 0 $a Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, $x 1613-5113 $3 1266773
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92618-6
912 $a ZDB-2-ECF
912 $a ZDB-2-SXEF
950 $a Economics and Finance (SpringerNature-41170)
950 $a Economics and Finance (R0) (SpringerNature-43720)