國立虎尾科技大學 |

Mind and Matter = Panpsychism, Dual-Aspect Monism, and the Combination Problem /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Mind and Matter/ by Jiri Benovsky.
Reminder of title:	Panpsychism, Dual-Aspect Monism, and the Combination Problem /
Author:	Benovsky, Jiri.
Description:	XI, 51 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Philosophy of mind. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9
ISBN:	9783030056339

Mind and Matter = Panpsychism, Dual-Aspect Monism, and the Combination Problem /
Benovsky, Jiri.

Mind and MatterPanpsychism, Dual-Aspect Monism, and the Combination Problem /[electronic resource] :by Jiri Benovsky. - 1st ed. 2018. - XI, 51 p.online resource. - SpringerBriefs in Philosophy,2211-4548. - SpringerBriefs in Philosophy,.

Chapter 1 – Pan-proto-dual-aspect-psychism -- Chapter 2 – Theoretical background, the mind-body problem -- Chapter 3 – Dual-aspect monism -- Chapter 4 – The combination problem(s) -- Chapter 5 – The subject of experience -- Chapter 6 – Eliminativism -- Chapter 8 – Concluding remarks.

In this book, the author takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of reality is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with an eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. .

ISBN: 9783030056339

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555804
Philosophy of mind.

LC Class. No.: B53

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

Mind and Matter = Panpsychism, Dual-Aspect Monism, and the Combination Problem /
LDR:03751nam a22003975i 4500 001 991446
003 DE-He213
005 20200704044820.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 201225s2018 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9783030056339 $9 978-3-030-05633-9
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-030-05633-9
050 4 $a B53
072 7 $a HPM $2 bicssc
072 7 $a PHI015000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a QDTM $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 128.2 $2 23
100 1 $a Benovsky, Jiri. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 1107290
245 1 0 $a Mind and Matter $h [electronic resource] : $b Panpsychism, Dual-Aspect Monism, and the Combination Problem / $c by Jiri Benovsky.
250 $a 1st ed. 2018.
264 1 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2018.
300 $a XI, 51 p. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
490 1 $a SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, $x 2211-4548
505 0 $a Chapter 1 – Pan-proto-dual-aspect-psychism -- Chapter 2 – Theoretical background, the mind-body problem -- Chapter 3 – Dual-aspect monism -- Chapter 4 – The combination problem(s) -- Chapter 5 – The subject of experience -- Chapter 6 – Eliminativism -- Chapter 8 – Concluding remarks.
520 $a In this book, the author takes a stand for a variant of panpsychism as being the best solution available to the mind-body problem. More exactly, he defends a view that can be labelled 'dual-aspect-pan-proto-psychism'. Panpsychism claims that mentality is ubiquitous to reality, and in combination with dual-aspect monism it claims that anything, from fundamental particles to rocks, trees, and human animals, has two aspects: a physical aspect and a mental aspect. In short, the view is that the nature of reality is 'phental' (physical-mental). But this does not mean, according to the author, that rocks and photons think or have conscious experiences, in the sense in which human animals have experiences. This is where pan-proto-psychism enters the picture as being a better theoretical option, where the mental aspects of fundamental particles, rocks, and trees are not experiential. Many hard questions arise here. In this book, Benovsky focuses on the combination problem: in short, how do tiny mental aspects of fundamental particles combine to yield macro-phenomenal conscious experiences, such as your complex experience when you enjoy a great gastronomic meal? What makes the question even harder is that the combination problem is not just one problem, but rather a family of various combination issues and worries. Benovsky offers a general strategy to deal with these combination problems and focuses on one in particular – namely, the worry concerning the existence of subjects of experience. Indeed, if standard panpsychism were true, we would need an explanation of how tiny micro-subjects combine into a macro-subject like a human person. And if panprotopsychism is true, it has to explain how a subject of experience can arise from proto-micro-mental aspects of reality. Benovsky shows that understanding the nature of subjectivity in terms of the growingly familiar notion of mineness in combination with an eliminativist view of the self, allows us to have a coherent picture, where this type of combination problem is avoided, without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. .
650 0 $a Philosophy of mind. $3 555804
650 1 4 $a Philosophy of Mind. $3 668203
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030056322
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783030056346
830 0 $a SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, $x 2211-4548 $3 1254230
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05633-9
912 $a ZDB-2-REP
912 $a ZDB-2-SXPR
950 $a Religion and Philosophy (SpringerNature-41175)
950 $a Philosophy and Religion (R0) (SpringerNature-43725)