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The Origin of the Capitalist Firm = An Entrepreneurial/Contractual Theory of the Firm /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Origin of the Capitalist Firm/ by Weiying Zhang.
其他題名:	An Entrepreneurial/Contractual Theory of the Firm /
作者:	Zhang, Weiying.
面頁冊數:	XVI, 196 p. 20 illus.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Entrepreneurship. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0221-2
ISBN:	9789811002212

The Origin of the Capitalist Firm = An Entrepreneurial/Contractual Theory of the Firm /
Zhang, Weiying.

The Origin of the Capitalist FirmAn Entrepreneurial/Contractual Theory of the Firm /[electronic resource] :by Weiying Zhang. - 1st ed. 2018. - XVI, 196 p. 20 illus.online resource.

Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the first edition -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1 Introduction: Why Does Capital Hire Labour? -- Chapter 2 Marketing, Producing, Monitoring and the Assignment of Principalship -- Chapter 3 Marketing Ability, Personal Wealth and Capital-Hiring-Labour -- Chapter 4 A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Model of the Firm -- Chapter 5 Conclusions -- References -- Appendix 1: A Principal-agent Theory of Public Economy and Its Applications to China -- Appendix 2: Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How Chinese State-owned Enterprise Reform Works. .

The book addresses the entrepreneurial origin of the capitalist firm and its asymmetric contractual relationships between capitalists, workers, managers and entrepreneurs, and explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship. A hidden action model shows how assigning residual claim to entrepreneurs can provide a better overall incentive; a hidden information model demonstrates that capitalists are given priority and have authority to select the management, because capital can signal entrepreneurial ability; and a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model shows that the equilibrium relationships between different members of the firm depend on the joint distribution of ability, wealth and risk attitudes in the population. Overall, the book reveals that the capitalist firm is more efficient, not only because it provides better incentives but also because it ensures that the most entrepreneurial people control the firm. .

ISBN: 9789811002212

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-10-0221-2doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

559908
Entrepreneurship.

LC Class. No.: HB615

Dewey Class. No.: 658.421

The Origin of the Capitalist Firm = An Entrepreneurial/Contractual Theory of the Firm /
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505 0 $a Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the first edition -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1 Introduction: Why Does Capital Hire Labour? -- Chapter 2 Marketing, Producing, Monitoring and the Assignment of Principalship -- Chapter 3 Marketing Ability, Personal Wealth and Capital-Hiring-Labour -- Chapter 4 A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Model of the Firm -- Chapter 5 Conclusions -- References -- Appendix 1: A Principal-agent Theory of Public Economy and Its Applications to China -- Appendix 2: Decision Rights, Residual Claim and Performance: A Theory of How Chinese State-owned Enterprise Reform Works. .
520 $a The book addresses the entrepreneurial origin of the capitalist firm and its asymmetric contractual relationships between capitalists, workers, managers and entrepreneurs, and explains the origin of the firm by focusing on entrepreneurship. A hidden action model shows how assigning residual claim to entrepreneurs can provide a better overall incentive; a hidden information model demonstrates that capitalists are given priority and have authority to select the management, because capital can signal entrepreneurial ability; and a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model shows that the equilibrium relationships between different members of the firm depend on the joint distribution of ability, wealth and risk attitudes in the population. Overall, the book reveals that the capitalist firm is more efficient, not only because it provides better incentives but also because it ensures that the most entrepreneurial people control the firm. .
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