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Rationality, Time, and Self

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Rationality, Time, and Self/ by Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson.
Author:	Pearson, Olley (F.O.C.H.).
Description:	XII, 273 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Metaphysics. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71973-3
ISBN:	9783319719733

Rationality, Time, and Self
Pearson, Olley (F.O.C.H.).

Rationality, Time, and Self[electronic resource] /by Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson. - 1st ed. 2018. - XII, 273 p.online resource.

Chapter 1: Introduction -- PART I: INDEXICALS AND RATIONALITY -- Chapter 2: Tense and Emotions -- Chapter 3: Indexicals and Actions -- PART II: RATIONALITY -- Chapter 4: Reasons -- Chapter 5: Acting for a Reason -- Chapter 6: Rationality -- PART III: THE REALITY OF TENSE AND EMERGENCE OF THE SELF -- Chapter 7: The Argument from Rational Action -- Chapter 8: Implications for Non-indexical Cases -- Chapter 9: The Argument from Appropriate Emotions -- Chapter 10: Time and Self -- Chapter 11: Closing Remarks.

This book provides a new argument for the tensed theory of time and emergentism about the self. This argument derives in part from theories which establish our nature as rational and emotional beings whose behavior is responsive to reasons which are facts. It is argued that there must be reasons, hence facts, that can only be captured by tensed and/or first-personal language if our behavior is to be by and large rational and appropriate. This establishes the tensed theory of time and emergentism or dualism about the self, given the physical body can plausibly be fully described non-first-personally. In the course of this discussion the book also clarifies and defends a notion of fact and responds to McTaggart’s paradox and Wittgenstein’s private language argument.

ISBN: 9783319719733

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-71973-3doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555859
Metaphysics.

LC Class. No.: BD95-131

Dewey Class. No.: 110

Rationality, Time, and Self
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505 0 $a Chapter 1: Introduction -- PART I: INDEXICALS AND RATIONALITY -- Chapter 2: Tense and Emotions -- Chapter 3: Indexicals and Actions -- PART II: RATIONALITY -- Chapter 4: Reasons -- Chapter 5: Acting for a Reason -- Chapter 6: Rationality -- PART III: THE REALITY OF TENSE AND EMERGENCE OF THE SELF -- Chapter 7: The Argument from Rational Action -- Chapter 8: Implications for Non-indexical Cases -- Chapter 9: The Argument from Appropriate Emotions -- Chapter 10: Time and Self -- Chapter 11: Closing Remarks.
520 $a This book provides a new argument for the tensed theory of time and emergentism about the self. This argument derives in part from theories which establish our nature as rational and emotional beings whose behavior is responsive to reasons which are facts. It is argued that there must be reasons, hence facts, that can only be captured by tensed and/or first-personal language if our behavior is to be by and large rational and appropriate. This establishes the tensed theory of time and emergentism or dualism about the self, given the physical body can plausibly be fully described non-first-personally. In the course of this discussion the book also clarifies and defends a notion of fact and responds to McTaggart’s paradox and Wittgenstein’s private language argument.
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