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Truth in Fiction = Rethinking its Logic /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Truth in Fiction/ by John Woods.
其他題名:	Rethinking its Logic /
作者:	Woods, John.
面頁冊數:	XIV, 239 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Language and languages—Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72658-8
ISBN:	9783319726588

Truth in Fiction = Rethinking its Logic /
Woods, John.

Truth in FictionRethinking its Logic /[electronic resource] :by John Woods. - 1st ed. 2018. - XIV, 239 p.online resource. - Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,3910166-6991 ;. - Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,359.

1. Misconception and Pretence -- 2. A Research Programme for Fiction -- 3. What Readers Know -- 4. Truth-Making -- 5. Sherlock -- 6. Models and Formal Representations -- 7. “Sherlock” -- 8. Salty Tears and Racing Hearts -- 9. Other Things Sherlock Isn’t -- 10. Putting Inconsistency to Rest.

This monograph examines truth in fiction by applying the techniques of a naturalized logic of human cognitive practices. The author structures his project around two focal questions. What would it take to write a book about truth in literary discourse with reasonable promise of getting it right? What would it take to write a book about truth in fiction as true to the facts of lived literary experience as objectivity allows? It is argued that the most semantically distinctive feature of the sentences of fiction is that they are unambiguously true and false together. It is true that Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street and also concurrently false that he did. A second distinctive feature of fiction is that the reader at large knows of this inconsistency and isn’t in the least cognitively molested by it. Why, it is asked, would this be so? What would explain it? Two answers are developed. According to the no-contradiction thesis, the semantically tangled sentences of fiction are indeed logically inconsistent but not logically contradictory. According to the no-bother thesis, if the inconsistencies of fiction were contradictory, a properly contrived logic for the rational management of inconsistency would explain why readers at large are not thrown off cognitive stride by their embrace of those contradictions. As developed here, the account of fiction suggests the presence of an underlying three - or four-valued dialethic logic. The author shows this to be a mistaken impression. There are only two truth-values in his logic of fiction. The naturalized logic of Truth in Fiction jettisons some of the standard assumptions and analytical tools of contemporary philosophy, chiefly because the neurotypical linguistic and cognitive behaviour of humanity at large is at variance with them. Using the resources of a causal response epistemology in tandem with the naturalized logic, the theory produced here is data-driven, empirically sensitive, and open to a circumspect collaboration with the empirical sciences of language and cognition.

ISBN: 9783319726588

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-72658-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

1254282
Language and languages—Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: P101-120

Dewey Class. No.: 149.94

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