國立虎尾科技大學 |

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate = Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate/ by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi.
其他題名:	Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /
作者:	Felsenthal, Dan S.
其他作者:	Nurmi, Hannu.
面頁冊數:	XV, 134 p.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Welfare economics. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1
ISBN:	9783319740331

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate = Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /
Felsenthal, Dan S.

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single CandidateProving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /[electronic resource] :by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi. - 1st ed. 2018. - XV, 134 p.online resource. - SpringerBriefs in Economics,2191-5504. - SpringerBriefs in Economics,.

Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

ISBN: 9783319740331

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

555259
Welfare economics.

LC Class. No.: HB846-846.8

Dewey Class. No.: 302.1

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate = Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes /
LDR:02379nam a22003975i 4500 001 996670
003 DE-He213
005 20200705214013.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 201225s2018 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 $a 9783319740331 $9 978-3-319-74033-1
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-319-74033-1
050 4 $a HB846-846.8
072 7 $a KCA $2 bicssc
072 7 $a BUS069030 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a KCA $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 302.1 $2 23
100 1 $a Felsenthal, Dan S. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 889617
245 1 0 $a Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate $h [electronic resource] : $b Proving Their (In)Vulnerability to Various Voting Paradoxes / $c by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi.
250 $a 1st ed. 2018.
264 1 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2018.
300 $a XV, 134 p. $b online resource.
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
347 $a text file $b PDF $2 rda
490 1 $a SpringerBriefs in Economics, $x 2191-5504
505 0 $a Introduction -- Voting Paradoxes -- Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that are Not Condorcet-Consistent to Various Paradoxes -- The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet-Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes -- Summary.
520 $a This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.
650 0 $a Welfare economics. $3 555259
650 0 $a Elections. $3 555219
650 0 $a Political philosophy. $3 1253605
650 0 $a Economic theory. $3 809881
650 0 $a Democracy. $3 557320
650 1 4 $a Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy. $3 1209828
650 2 4 $a Electoral Politics. $3 1105083
650 2 4 $a Political Philosophy. $3 671691
650 2 4 $a Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. $3 1069071
700 1 $a Nurmi, Hannu. $4 aut $4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut $3 1075099
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 593884
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783319740324
776 0 8 $i Printed edition: $z 9783319740348
830 0 $a SpringerBriefs in Economics, $x 2191-5504 $3 1256355
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1
912 $a ZDB-2-ECF
912 $a ZDB-2-SXEF
950 $a Economics and Finance (SpringerNature-41170)
950 $a Economics and Finance (R0) (SpringerNature-43720)