國立虎尾科技大學 |

Web and Internet Economics = 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Web and Internet Economics/ edited by Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen.
Reminder of title:	17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings /
other author:	Feldman, Michal.
Description:	XIV, 558 p. 65 illus., 48 illus. in color.online resource. :
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Algorithms. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0
ISBN:	9783030946760

Web and Internet Economics = 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings /
Web and Internet Economics17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings /[electronic resource] :edited by Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen. - 1st ed. 2022. - XIV, 558 p. 65 illus., 48 illus. in color.online resource. - Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ;13112. - Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI ;9149.

Mechanism Design and Pricing -- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality -- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials -- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing -- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design -- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss -- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances -- Contract Design for A orestation Programs -- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching -- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness -- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals -- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction -- Matching, Markets and Equilibria -- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model -- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis -- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home -- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods -- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem -- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy -- The Platform Design Problem -- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria -- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations -- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations -- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem -- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias -- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment -- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies -- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary -- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice -- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries -- Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes -- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies.

ISBN: 9783030946760

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

527865
Algorithms.

LC Class. No.: QA9.58

Dewey Class. No.: 005.13

Web and Internet Economics = 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14–17, 2021, Proceedings /
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