國立虎尾科技大學 |

Private Business under Authoritarianism : = Party Organizations, Associations, and Entrepreneurs in China.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Private Business under Authoritarianism :/
Reminder of title:	Party Organizations, Associations, and Entrepreneurs in China.
Author:	Jordan, Charles Austin.
Description:	1 online resource (241 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International86-05A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9798346571933

Private Business under Authoritarianism : = Party Organizations, Associations, and Entrepreneurs in China.
Jordan, Charles Austin.

Private Business under Authoritarianism :Party Organizations, Associations, and Entrepreneurs in China. - 1 online resource (241 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2024.

Includes bibliographical references

In governing their economies, authoritarian regimes are faced with a simple dilemma. As the primary source of innovation and growth, autocrats rely on the private sector to meet their economic development goals. At the same time, the accumulation of wealth and resources by actors outside of the regime empowers them with ability to mount political challenges in pursuit of their own interests. To manage this tension, autocrats must devise strategies that balance between fostering a sufficiently liberal business environment and mitigating threats to their control; they must essentially choose between methods that monitor, co-opt, or repress. How do authoritarian regimes select and implement such strategies?This dissertation is an investigation into how this process has unfolded in China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the private sector's reemergence in 1978. I argue that the CCP has drawn from its historical experience as a Marxist-Leninist party to pursue a strategy of governance that monitors and co-opts private business, rather than represses. It has developed a strategy of constructing pervasive, institutional linkages with firms that serve to build its presence widely throughout the private economy. These institutions are 1) grassroots Party organizations, established within firms themselves, and 2) business associations, which also host Party organizations. Over the course of seven chapters, I trace how the Party developed this strategy. I utilize an original panel dataset of annual business association filings, field interviews with private entrepreneurs, historical documents, and an analysis of twenty years of survey data to illustrate the causes and consequences of the Party's approach to governing private business.In Chapter 2, I develop my main theory concerning the evolution of linkage institutions as tools for governing the private economy in China. I explain how the Party evaluated the threat of entrepreneurs over time, and the reasoning behind their strategy of governance. I develop the idea of `controlled liberalization' to explain the timing of their changes in strategy. Chapters 3 and 4 address the role of business associations in China's political economy. I explain why they remain stymied in their development until only recently and show how their recent liberalization has served to bring more firms into contact with the Party. Chapter 5 presents findings from my field research in Guangzhou and Shanghai. Surprisingly, I show how the Party has been successful in convincing greater numbers of entrepreneurs to voluntarily comply with the Party building campaign by reimagining and propagandizing new roles of grassroots Party cells and committees. Chapter 6 validates my historical claims about threat perception and entrepreneur's willingness to engage with linkage institutions by drawing from twenty years of survey data. The final chapter concludes by summarizing the implications of the CCP's approach and projecting future developments for China's private economy.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9798346571933Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

ChinaIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Private Business under Authoritarianism : = Party Organizations, Associations, and Entrepreneurs in China.
LDR:04502ntm a22004217 4500 001 1152792
005 20241213095602.5
006 m o d
007 cr mn ---uuuuu
008 250605s2024 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9798346571933
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI31560557
035 $a AAI31560557
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Jordan, Charles Austin. $3 1479880
245 1 0 $a Private Business under Authoritarianism : $b Party Organizations, Associations, and Entrepreneurs in China.
264 0 $c 2024
300 $a 1 online resource (241 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 86-05, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Davis, Christina L.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2024.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a In governing their economies, authoritarian regimes are faced with a simple dilemma. As the primary source of innovation and growth, autocrats rely on the private sector to meet their economic development goals. At the same time, the accumulation of wealth and resources by actors outside of the regime empowers them with ability to mount political challenges in pursuit of their own interests. To manage this tension, autocrats must devise strategies that balance between fostering a sufficiently liberal business environment and mitigating threats to their control; they must essentially choose between methods that monitor, co-opt, or repress. How do authoritarian regimes select and implement such strategies?This dissertation is an investigation into how this process has unfolded in China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the private sector's reemergence in 1978. I argue that the CCP has drawn from its historical experience as a Marxist-Leninist party to pursue a strategy of governance that monitors and co-opts private business, rather than represses. It has developed a strategy of constructing pervasive, institutional linkages with firms that serve to build its presence widely throughout the private economy. These institutions are 1) grassroots Party organizations, established within firms themselves, and 2) business associations, which also host Party organizations. Over the course of seven chapters, I trace how the Party developed this strategy. I utilize an original panel dataset of annual business association filings, field interviews with private entrepreneurs, historical documents, and an analysis of twenty years of survey data to illustrate the causes and consequences of the Party's approach to governing private business.In Chapter 2, I develop my main theory concerning the evolution of linkage institutions as tools for governing the private economy in China. I explain how the Party evaluated the threat of entrepreneurs over time, and the reasoning behind their strategy of governance. I develop the idea of `controlled liberalization' to explain the timing of their changes in strategy. Chapters 3 and 4 address the role of business associations in China's political economy. I explain why they remain stymied in their development until only recently and show how their recent liberalization has served to bring more firms into contact with the Party. Chapter 5 presents findings from my field research in Guangzhou and Shanghai. Surprisingly, I show how the Party has been successful in convincing greater numbers of entrepreneurs to voluntarily comply with the Party building campaign by reimagining and propagandizing new roles of grassroots Party cells and committees. Chapter 6 validates my historical claims about threat perception and entrepreneur's willingness to engage with linkage institutions by drawing from twenty years of survey data. The final chapter concludes by summarizing the implications of the CCP's approach and projecting future developments for China's private economy.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Political science. $3 558774
650 4 $a Asian studies. $3 1179577
653 $a China
653 $a Chinese Communist Party
653 $a Civil society
653 $a Party building
653 $a Political economy
653 $a State-business relations
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0342
690 $a 0601
690 $a 0429
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a Harvard University. $b Government. $3 1195292
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 86-05A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31560557 $z click for full text (PQDT)