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Optimization of Cooperative Game Theory-Based Incentive Structure for Integrating Cost and Carbon Emission in Collaborative Shipping /

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Optimization of Cooperative Game Theory-Based Incentive Structure for Integrating Cost and Carbon Emission in Collaborative Shipping // Peter Young Atteh.
Author:	Atteh, Peter Young,
Description:	1 electronic resource (69 pages)
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International86-01.
Subject:	Industrial engineering. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=31241161
ISBN:	9798383282588

Optimization of Cooperative Game Theory-Based Incentive Structure for Integrating Cost and Carbon Emission in Collaborative Shipping /
Atteh, Peter Young,

Optimization of Cooperative Game Theory-Based Incentive Structure for Integrating Cost and Carbon Emission in Collaborative Shipping /Peter Young Atteh. - 1 electronic resource (69 pages)

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 86-01.

Collaborative shipping initiatives offer significant benefits. This study evaluates an incentive structure for allocating costs and carbon emissions among companies engaged in collaborative shipping. It explores how third-party logistics (3PL) companies, acting as carriers, can effectively demonstrate the advantages of collaboration to their clients, the shippers. Leveraging their role as key facilitators of information sharing in the logistics industry, 3PLs play a vital role in promoting collaborative practices among companies. Therefore, utilizing cooperative game theory principles and linear programming techniques, a comprehensive framework that integrates cost and carbon emission factors into the characteristic functions of a cooperative game is proposed, highlighting opportunities and benefits. This framework contributes to a better understanding of how 3PLs can drive collaboration and efficiency in the logistics ecosystem, fostering cooperation and fairness in cost allocation while simultaneously demonstrating carbon emission reductions. Through analyzing a demonstrative dataset and applying linear programming, the nucleolus is identified as a unique solution for optimizing collaboration. The proposed structure ensures rationality, marginality, and completeness in cost and carbon emission allocation as a measure of fairness leading to efficient outcomes. Comparative analysis against the Shapley value and proportional-based allocation methods highlights the uniqueness of the nucleolus approach as it maximizes the gains of the least satisfied coalition (strategic alternative) in lexicographical order, thereby minimizing the propensity to disrupt collaboration. This order serves as the structure, between cost optimization and the reduction of carbon emissions as the allocated incentives. Overall, our study provides insights into the development of an incentive allocation structure in collaborative shipping, integrating two cooperative games into a single model to generate two outcomes, advancing existing methodologies to incentivize collaboration and drive positive impacts within the supply chain.

English

ISBN: 9798383282588Subjects--Topical Terms:

679492
Industrial engineering.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Carbon emissions

Optimization of Cooperative Game Theory-Based Incentive Structure for Integrating Cost and Carbon Emission in Collaborative Shipping /
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520 $a Collaborative shipping initiatives offer significant benefits. This study evaluates an incentive structure for allocating costs and carbon emissions among companies engaged in collaborative shipping. It explores how third-party logistics (3PL) companies, acting as carriers, can effectively demonstrate the advantages of collaboration to their clients, the shippers. Leveraging their role as key facilitators of information sharing in the logistics industry, 3PLs play a vital role in promoting collaborative practices among companies. Therefore, utilizing cooperative game theory principles and linear programming techniques, a comprehensive framework that integrates cost and carbon emission factors into the characteristic functions of a cooperative game is proposed, highlighting opportunities and benefits. This framework contributes to a better understanding of how 3PLs can drive collaboration and efficiency in the logistics ecosystem, fostering cooperation and fairness in cost allocation while simultaneously demonstrating carbon emission reductions. Through analyzing a demonstrative dataset and applying linear programming, the nucleolus is identified as a unique solution for optimizing collaboration. The proposed structure ensures rationality, marginality, and completeness in cost and carbon emission allocation as a measure of fairness leading to efficient outcomes. Comparative analysis against the Shapley value and proportional-based allocation methods highlights the uniqueness of the nucleolus approach as it maximizes the gains of the least satisfied coalition (strategic alternative) in lexicographical order, thereby minimizing the propensity to disrupt collaboration. This order serves as the structure, between cost optimization and the reduction of carbon emissions as the allocated incentives. Overall, our study provides insights into the development of an incentive allocation structure in collaborative shipping, integrating two cooperative games into a single model to generate two outcomes, advancing existing methodologies to incentivize collaboration and drive positive impacts within the supply chain.
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650 4 $a Sustainability. $3 793436
650 4 $a Transportation. $3 558117
653 $a Carbon emissions
653 $a Cooperative game theory
653 $a Cost saving
653 $a Incentive allocation structure
653 $a Linear programming
653 $a Nucleolus
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