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Game-Theoretic Models of Animal Beha...
~
Dai, Yao.
Game-Theoretic Models of Animal Behavior Observed in Some Recent Experiments.
Record Type:
Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:
Game-Theoretic Models of Animal Behavior Observed in Some Recent Experiments./
Author:
Dai, Yao.
Description:
1 online resource (100 pages)
Notes:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: B.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International78-11B(E).
Subject:
Mathematics. -
Online resource:
click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:
9781369863635
Game-Theoretic Models of Animal Behavior Observed in Some Recent Experiments.
Dai, Yao.
Game-Theoretic Models of Animal Behavior Observed in Some Recent Experiments.
- 1 online resource (100 pages)
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: B.
Thesis (Ph.D.)
Includes bibliographical references
In this dissertation, we create three theoretical models to answer questions raised by recent experiments that lie beyond the scope of current theory. In the landmark-effect model, we determine size, shape and location for a territory that is optimal in the sense of minimizing defense costs, when a given proportion of the boundary is landmarked and its primary benefit in terms of fitness is greater ease of detecting intruders across it. In the subjective-resource-value model, we develop a game-theoretic model based on the War-of-Attrition game. Our results confirm that allowing players to adapt their subjective resource value based on their experiences can generate strong winner effects with weak or even no loser effects, which is not predicted by other theoretical models. In the rearguard-action model, we develop two versions of a game-theoretic model with different hypotheses on the function of volatile chemical emissions in animal contests, and we compare their results with observations in experiments. The two hypotheses are whether volatile chemicals are released to prevent the winner of the current round of contest from translating its victory into permanent possession of a contested resource, or are used to prevent a winner from inflicting costs on a fleeing loser.
Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018
Mode of access: World Wide Web
ISBN: 9781369863635Subjects--Topical Terms:
527692
Mathematics.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:
554714
Electronic books.
Game-Theoretic Models of Animal Behavior Observed in Some Recent Experiments.
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Game-Theoretic Models of Animal Behavior Observed in Some Recent Experiments.
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Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: B.
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The Florida State University
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2017.
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Includes bibliographical references
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In this dissertation, we create three theoretical models to answer questions raised by recent experiments that lie beyond the scope of current theory. In the landmark-effect model, we determine size, shape and location for a territory that is optimal in the sense of minimizing defense costs, when a given proportion of the boundary is landmarked and its primary benefit in terms of fitness is greater ease of detecting intruders across it. In the subjective-resource-value model, we develop a game-theoretic model based on the War-of-Attrition game. Our results confirm that allowing players to adapt their subjective resource value based on their experiences can generate strong winner effects with weak or even no loser effects, which is not predicted by other theoretical models. In the rearguard-action model, we develop two versions of a game-theoretic model with different hypotheses on the function of volatile chemical emissions in animal contests, and we compare their results with observations in experiments. The two hypotheses are whether volatile chemicals are released to prevent the winner of the current round of contest from translating its victory into permanent possession of a contested resource, or are used to prevent a winner from inflicting costs on a fleeing loser.
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Ann Arbor, Mich. :
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ProQuest,
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2018
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Mode of access: World Wide Web
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Mathematics.
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http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10260522
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click for full text (PQDT)
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