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Does the Threat of Whistleblowing Reduce Accounting Fraud?

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Does the Threat of Whistleblowing Reduce Accounting Fraud?/
Author:	Lee, Hee Min.
Description:	1 online resource (69 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
Subject:	Accounting. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355078251

Does the Threat of Whistleblowing Reduce Accounting Fraud?
Lee, Hee Min.

Does the Threat of Whistleblowing Reduce Accounting Fraud? - 1 online resource (69 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This paper examines the deterrence effect of whistleblowing threats on the probability of accounting fraud. I predict that firms' exposure to whistleblowing laws can create ex ante incentives for managers to deter fraud. If a state has adopted a False Claims Act (FCA), whistleblowers who report fraud involving that state's pension fund investments are eligible for monetary rewards. Using staggered adoption of FCAs by states between 1987 and 2010, and comparing firms that are now exposed to a state FCA due to state pension fund ownership in the firm with other control firms, I find firms' exposure to the threat of whistleblowing under the FCA reduces the probability of accounting fraud by 7%. Also, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision in 2011, the probability of accounting fraud declined more pronouncedly among firms that had not been affected previously by state FCAs. I also find firms' exposure to whistleblowing threats reduces audit fees by 5%, consistent with concerned managers tightening internal controls to detect fraud, which can substitute for external audits and/or reduce the control risk auditors face. Overall, this paper sheds light on the policy debate over the effectiveness of whistleblower provisions in preventing fraud.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355078251Subjects--Topical Terms:

561166
Accounting.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Does the Threat of Whistleblowing Reduce Accounting Fraud?
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245 1 0 $a Does the Threat of Whistleblowing Reduce Accounting Fraud?
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Philip G. Berger.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This paper examines the deterrence effect of whistleblowing threats on the probability of accounting fraud. I predict that firms' exposure to whistleblowing laws can create ex ante incentives for managers to deter fraud. If a state has adopted a False Claims Act (FCA), whistleblowers who report fraud involving that state's pension fund investments are eligible for monetary rewards. Using staggered adoption of FCAs by states between 1987 and 2010, and comparing firms that are now exposed to a state FCA due to state pension fund ownership in the firm with other control firms, I find firms' exposure to the threat of whistleblowing under the FCA reduces the probability of accounting fraud by 7%. Also, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision in 2011, the probability of accounting fraud declined more pronouncedly among firms that had not been affected previously by state FCAs. I also find firms' exposure to whistleblowing threats reduces audit fees by 5%, consistent with concerned managers tightening internal controls to detect fraud, which can substitute for external audits and/or reduce the control risk auditors face. Overall, this paper sheds light on the policy debate over the effectiveness of whistleblower provisions in preventing fraud.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Accounting. $3 561166
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Business. $3 1179073
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