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Against Reason : = A Defense of Mode...

ProQuest Information and Learning Co.

Against Reason : = A Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Against Reason :/
Reminder of title:	A Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism.
Author:	Vadakin, Aron.
Description:	1 online resource (161 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-07A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355619355

Against Reason : = A Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism.
Vadakin, Aron.

Against Reason :A Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism. - 1 online resource (161 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

This dissertation both surveys contemporary work in metanormativity and argues for a position that I call moderate normative skepticism. I begin by evaluating efforts to characterize the normative domain and conclude that while some normative concepts and properties are amenable to naturalistic programs of reduction and analysis, other normative concepts and properties are not. I proceed to clarify accounts of reasons, reasoning, and rationality; this establishes argumentative room to maneuver for my moderate normative skepticism. Next, I evaluate moral error theories, which I count as close cousins of my own thesis, and I note how these error theories have more profound implications than their authors realize. I claim that, understood properly, these error theories extend to the domain of normative reasons in general. I accept and defend the extension of error theory as a viable position. In the final chapter of my dissertation, I defend my position against charges of self-defeat and attempt to anticipate and defuse potential criticisms.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355619355Subjects--Topical Terms:

559771
Philosophy.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Against Reason : = A Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism.
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245 1 0 $a Against Reason : $b A Defense of Moderate Normative Skepticism.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (161 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-07(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Alfred R. Mele.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a This dissertation both surveys contemporary work in metanormativity and argues for a position that I call moderate normative skepticism. I begin by evaluating efforts to characterize the normative domain and conclude that while some normative concepts and properties are amenable to naturalistic programs of reduction and analysis, other normative concepts and properties are not. I proceed to clarify accounts of reasons, reasoning, and rationality; this establishes argumentative room to maneuver for my moderate normative skepticism. Next, I evaluate moral error theories, which I count as close cousins of my own thesis, and I note how these error theories have more profound implications than their authors realize. I claim that, understood properly, these error theories extend to the domain of normative reasons in general. I accept and defend the extension of error theory as a viable position. In the final chapter of my dissertation, I defend my position against charges of self-defeat and attempt to anticipate and defuse potential criticisms.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 559771
650 4 $a Ethics. $3 555769
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0394
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The Florida State University. $b Philosophy. $3 1193041
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-07A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10638906 $z click for full text (PQDT)

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