國立虎尾科技大學 |

Informal Institutions and Elite Corruption in Young Democracies.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Informal Institutions and Elite Corruption in Young Democracies./
Author:	Smoler, Michelle.
Description:	1 online resource (56 pages)
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 56-06.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International56-06(E).
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355181289

Informal Institutions and Elite Corruption in Young Democracies.
Smoler, Michelle.

Informal Institutions and Elite Corruption in Young Democracies. - 1 online resource (56 pages)

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 56-06.

Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

Over the last century the world has seen several waves of democratization in the developing world. Despite expectations, the quality of these democracies has in many cases disappointed citizens and political onlookers alike. Rather than resulting in accountable and responsive governance, many countries still report high levels of corruption, lowering voters' trust and satisfaction with democracy. Research has sought to explain why democratic success or backsliding varies across countries, but has focused largely on formal institutions and their ability to constrain behavior, neglecting the role of informal rules and norms in influencing elite corruption in the long term. I argue that the quality of democratic governance following transition depends on the legacy of authoritarian-era informal institutions. When ex-authoritarian elites assume positions of power under democracy, they reproduce the informal rules and norms that structured their past behavior. To the extent that these rules and norms support democracy, elites will pursue accountable governing practices. More often, however, authoritarian-era informal institutions are incompatible with democratic principles and will encourage elites to engage in corrupt, non-accountable behavior. I test my argument using a cross-sectional time series, focusing on young democracies in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. I find that informal institutions are an essential component in explaining quality of governance in young democracies.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355181289Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Informal Institutions and Elite Corruption in Young Democracies.
LDR:02695ntm a2200325Ki 4500 001 920183
005 20181129120004.5
006 m o u
007 cr mn||||a|a||
008 190606s2017 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9780355181289
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10608051
035 $a (MiAaPQ)unc:17330
035 $a AAI10608051
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Smoler, Michelle. $3 1194913
245 1 0 $a Informal Institutions and Elite Corruption in Young Democracies.
264 0 $c 2017
300 $a 1 online resource (56 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 56-06.
500 $a Adviser: Milada Vachudova.
502 $a Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Over the last century the world has seen several waves of democratization in the developing world. Despite expectations, the quality of these democracies has in many cases disappointed citizens and political onlookers alike. Rather than resulting in accountable and responsive governance, many countries still report high levels of corruption, lowering voters' trust and satisfaction with democracy. Research has sought to explain why democratic success or backsliding varies across countries, but has focused largely on formal institutions and their ability to constrain behavior, neglecting the role of informal rules and norms in influencing elite corruption in the long term. I argue that the quality of democratic governance following transition depends on the legacy of authoritarian-era informal institutions. When ex-authoritarian elites assume positions of power under democracy, they reproduce the informal rules and norms that structured their past behavior. To the extent that these rules and norms support democracy, elites will pursue accountable governing practices. More often, however, authoritarian-era informal institutions are incompatible with democratic principles and will encourage elites to engage in corrupt, non-accountable behavior. I test my argument using a cross-sectional time series, focusing on young democracies in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. I find that informal institutions are an essential component in explaining quality of governance in young democracies.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Political science. $3 558774
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b Political Science. $3 1187090
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 56-06(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10608051 $z click for full text (PQDT)