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Oil Wealth and Ruling Party Longevity in Democracies.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Oil Wealth and Ruling Party Longevity in Democracies./
Author:	Bowman, Megan E.
Description:	1 online resource (126 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-05A(E).
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9780355442007

Oil Wealth and Ruling Party Longevity in Democracies.
Bowman, Megan E.

Oil Wealth and Ruling Party Longevity in Democracies. - 1 online resource (126 pages)

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2017.

Includes bibliographical references

Oil wealth offers politicians "free" (non-tax) revenues. To date the literature on oil wealth and regime longevity has focused heavily on the behaviors of autocratic or anocratic states with access to oil wealth; in these states leaders may pay to repress or co-opt their opposition with oil revenues. However, with new technologies and a general upward trend in oil prices, oil extraction is occurring in and near countries with relatively strong, institutionalized democratic governments. Can these democratic leaders likewise capitalize on their country's oil bounty to maintain their power, and if so, how? Direct repression a la autocrat will not be a viable option, however public spending to win over voters will be.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2018

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780355442007Subjects--Topical Terms:

558774
Political science.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Oil Wealth and Ruling Party Longevity in Democracies.
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245 1 0 $a Oil Wealth and Ruling Party Longevity in Democracies.
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300 $a 1 online resource (126 pages)
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Marcus Kurtz.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2017.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a Oil wealth offers politicians "free" (non-tax) revenues. To date the literature on oil wealth and regime longevity has focused heavily on the behaviors of autocratic or anocratic states with access to oil wealth; in these states leaders may pay to repress or co-opt their opposition with oil revenues. However, with new technologies and a general upward trend in oil prices, oil extraction is occurring in and near countries with relatively strong, institutionalized democratic governments. Can these democratic leaders likewise capitalize on their country's oil bounty to maintain their power, and if so, how? Direct repression a la autocrat will not be a viable option, however public spending to win over voters will be.
520 $a To date, much of the literature on public spending strategies to maintain office in an institutionalized democracy is focused on targeting spending to either swing or core voters. Specifically, some studies have indicated that in areas with low baseline turnout, focused spending on core voters will be a fruitful strategy, while in areas with high baseline turnout, focused spending on swing voters will be optimal. A spike in oil income will offer leaders a chance to Pareto-improve public spending allocations to localities, spending more on one group without taking that money directly away from another. This allows politicians to create a more even distribution across district types (swing, core), mixing these two strategies in an attempt to increase the ruling party's vote share.
520 $a This project is at the intersection of the literatures on public spending in democracies and ruling party longevity in resource-rich states. By examining well-institutionalized democracies, it adds to the latter literature, which heretofore has largely focused on autocracies and anocracies, and it substantiates and expands upon findings in the former by adding more nuance to a ruling party's choice of spending targets and why that strategy may change. The project begins with a large, cross-sectional panel dataset of leadership durations and resource wealth and shows that even with control variables, more resource wealth tends to help ruling parties stay in power longer; the addition of variables for public spending attenuate these effects, perhaps indicating that public spending is the channel through which resource wealth is converted to ruling party longevity. To substantiate this claim, and to examine how public spending helps ruling parties maintain power, in-depth case analyses of two well-institutionalized democracies, Ghana and the American States, are also included. The results show that where preexisting turnout is high, spending is initially concentrated on swing districts with less allocated to core districts, and vice versa; when oil wealth increases suddenly, the strategy changes and allocations are spread more evenly among swing and core districts.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2018
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Political science. $3 558774
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The Ohio State University. $b Political Science. $3 1183755
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-05A(E).
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10702618 $z click for full text (PQDT)