國立虎尾科技大學 |

Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker : = Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.

Record Type:	Language materials, manuscript : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker :/
Reminder of title:	Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.
Author:	Yao, Ting.
Description:	1 online resource (129 pages)
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-04A.
Subject:	Business administration. -
Online resource:	click for full text (PQDT)
ISBN:	9781088312254

Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker : = Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.
Yao, Ting.

Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker :Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards. - 1 online resource (129 pages)

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2019.

Includes bibliographical references

The venture capital (VC) business model significantly affects the startup companies they back financially. This study explores a phenomenon that is closely related to the VC business model and fund structure-VC-led time horizon differences among board members. VC-led time horizon differences are where directors are misaligned in terms of their preferred exit times. Since VC funds have a fixed lifetime, this finite horizon causes strong exit pressure toward the end of the fund's lifespan. Although entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have similar long-term time horizons at the outset of the relationship, factors such as entrepreneurs' aggressive goal-setting, time-bound VC funds, and the uncertain entrepreneurial process can shift the synchronous time horizons initially shared by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists. This dissertation investigates three questions: 1) Why and how often do VC-led time horizon differences arise? 2) How do VC-led time horizon differences affect board dynamics and exit outcomes? and 3) How can startups effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences? The focus of this analysis is on the board of directors, whose members are the most important people in deciding exit strategies, whether through an initial public offering (IPO), merger and acquisition (M&A), or bankruptcy.I conducted a field study to understand the origin of VC-led time horizon differences and their impact on board dynamics. I further tested the impact of VC-led time horizon differences on low-valued exits using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. VC-backed surgical device startups. The findings show that VC-led time horizon differences significantly increase the chance of bankruptcy and low-valued M&As. More importantly, the results of the systematic quantitative analysis suggest how to effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences by selecting certain types of directors (i.e., serial-entrepreneur independent directors, experienced VC directors, and by avoiding investor-executives) as well as the importance of carefully managing stage improvement when facing VC-led time horizon differences. This research contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance, VC management, entrepreneurship, and time perception. The findings have important practical implications for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and policymakers.

Electronic reproduction.
Ann Arbor, Mich. :
ProQuest,
2024

Mode of access: World Wide Web

ISBN: 9781088312254Subjects--Topical Terms:

1148568
Business administration.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Venture capitalIndex Terms--Genre/Form:

554714
Electronic books.

Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker : = Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.
LDR:03721ntm a22003617 4500 001 1148825
005 20240930105233.5
006 m o d
007 cr bn ---uuuuu
008 250605s2019 xx obm 000 0 eng d
020 $a 9781088312254
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI13901698
035 $a AAI13901698
040 $a MiAaPQ $b eng $c MiAaPQ $d NTU
100 1 $a Yao, Ting. $3 1474895
245 1 0 $a Dream Maker vs. Dream Taker : $b Effects of Venture Capital Investors and Entrepreneurial Boards.
264 0 $c 2019
300 $a 1 online resource (129 pages)
336 $a text $b txt $2 rdacontent
337 $a computer $b c $2 rdamedia
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: O'Neill, Hugh.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2019.
504 $a Includes bibliographical references
520 $a The venture capital (VC) business model significantly affects the startup companies they back financially. This study explores a phenomenon that is closely related to the VC business model and fund structure-VC-led time horizon differences among board members. VC-led time horizon differences are where directors are misaligned in terms of their preferred exit times. Since VC funds have a fixed lifetime, this finite horizon causes strong exit pressure toward the end of the fund's lifespan. Although entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have similar long-term time horizons at the outset of the relationship, factors such as entrepreneurs' aggressive goal-setting, time-bound VC funds, and the uncertain entrepreneurial process can shift the synchronous time horizons initially shared by the entrepreneur and the venture capitalists. This dissertation investigates three questions: 1) Why and how often do VC-led time horizon differences arise? 2) How do VC-led time horizon differences affect board dynamics and exit outcomes? and 3) How can startups effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences? The focus of this analysis is on the board of directors, whose members are the most important people in deciding exit strategies, whether through an initial public offering (IPO), merger and acquisition (M&A), or bankruptcy.I conducted a field study to understand the origin of VC-led time horizon differences and their impact on board dynamics. I further tested the impact of VC-led time horizon differences on low-valued exits using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. VC-backed surgical device startups. The findings show that VC-led time horizon differences significantly increase the chance of bankruptcy and low-valued M&As. More importantly, the results of the systematic quantitative analysis suggest how to effectively manage VC-led time horizon differences by selecting certain types of directors (i.e., serial-entrepreneur independent directors, experienced VC directors, and by avoiding investor-executives) as well as the importance of carefully managing stage improvement when facing VC-led time horizon differences. This research contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance, VC management, entrepreneurship, and time perception. The findings have important practical implications for entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and policymakers.
533 $a Electronic reproduction. $b Ann Arbor, Mich. : $c ProQuest, $d 2024
538 $a Mode of access: World Wide Web
650 4 $a Business administration. $3 1148568
653 $a Venture capital
653 $a Entrepreneurship
653 $a Boards of directors
653 $a Corporate governance
655 7 $a Electronic books. $2 local $3 554714
690 $a 0310
710 2 $a ProQuest Information and Learning Co. $3 1178819
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b Business Administration. $3 1183438
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 81-04A.
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13901698 $z click for full text (PQDT)