語系:
繁體中文
English
說明(常見問題)
登入
回首頁
切換:
標籤
|
MARC模式
|
ISBD
Metaepistemology and Relativism
~
SpringerLink (Online service)
Metaepistemology and Relativism
紀錄類型:
書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Metaepistemology and Relativism/ by J. Carter.
作者:
Carter, J.
面頁冊數:
XIV, 298 p.online resource. :
Contained By:
Springer Nature eBook
標題:
Music. -
電子資源:
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137336644
ISBN:
9781137336644
Metaepistemology and Relativism
Carter, J.
Metaepistemology and Relativism
[electronic resource] /by J. Carter. - 1st ed. 2016. - XIV, 298 p.online resource. - Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. - Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy.
Is knowledge relative? Many academics across the humanities are happy to say that it is. However, those who work in mainstream epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge, generally take for granted that it is not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions whether the kind of anti-relativistic background that underlies most typical projects in mainstream epistemology can on closer inspection be vindicated. To this end, prominent and diverse argument strategies for epistemic relativism are considered and criticised. It is shown that a common weakness of more traditional argument strategies for epistemic relativism is that they fail to decisively motivate relativism over scepticism. Interestingly, though, this style of objection cannot be effectively redeployed against the new (semantic) variety of epistemic relativism—itself introduced only in the past decade. Although new (semantic) epistemic relativism constitutes an entirely different kind of challenge to mainstream epistemology than traditional forms, the new variety itself faces a dilemma. Once the dilemma is appreciated, it will be shown that the threat to mainstream epistemology that epistemic relativism is best understood as posing is in fact a very different one than we'd be originally inclined to think.
ISBN: 9781137336644
Standard No.: 10.1057/9781137336644doiSubjects--Topical Terms:
649088
Music.
LC Class. No.: M1-960
Dewey Class. No.: 780
Metaepistemology and Relativism
LDR
:02637nam a22003975i 4500
001
971816
003
DE-He213
005
20200703031239.0
007
cr nn 008mamaa
008
201211s2016 xxk| s |||| 0|eng d
020
$a
9781137336644
$9
978-1-137-33664-4
024
7
$a
10.1057/9781137336644
$2
doi
035
$a
978-1-137-33664-4
050
4
$a
M1-960
072
7
$a
AV
$2
bicssc
072
7
$a
MUS000000
$2
bisacsh
072
7
$a
AV
$2
thema
082
0 4
$a
780
$2
23
100
1
$a
Carter, J.
$e
author.
$4
aut
$4
http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
$3
1267103
245
1 0
$a
Metaepistemology and Relativism
$h
[electronic resource] /
$c
by J. Carter.
250
$a
1st ed. 2016.
264
1
$a
London :
$b
Palgrave Macmillan UK :
$b
Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan,
$c
2016.
300
$a
XIV, 298 p.
$b
online resource.
336
$a
text
$b
txt
$2
rdacontent
337
$a
computer
$b
c
$2
rdamedia
338
$a
online resource
$b
cr
$2
rdacarrier
347
$a
text file
$b
PDF
$2
rda
490
1
$a
Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy
520
$a
Is knowledge relative? Many academics across the humanities are happy to say that it is. However, those who work in mainstream epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge, generally take for granted that it is not. Metaepistemology and Relativism questions whether the kind of anti-relativistic background that underlies most typical projects in mainstream epistemology can on closer inspection be vindicated. To this end, prominent and diverse argument strategies for epistemic relativism are considered and criticised. It is shown that a common weakness of more traditional argument strategies for epistemic relativism is that they fail to decisively motivate relativism over scepticism. Interestingly, though, this style of objection cannot be effectively redeployed against the new (semantic) variety of epistemic relativism—itself introduced only in the past decade. Although new (semantic) epistemic relativism constitutes an entirely different kind of challenge to mainstream epistemology than traditional forms, the new variety itself faces a dilemma. Once the dilemma is appreciated, it will be shown that the threat to mainstream epistemology that epistemic relativism is best understood as posing is in fact a very different one than we'd be originally inclined to think.
650
0
$a
Music.
$3
649088
650
0
$a
Philosophy of mind.
$3
555804
650
2 4
$a
Philosophy of Mind.
$3
668203
710
2
$a
SpringerLink (Online service)
$3
593884
773
0
$t
Springer Nature eBook
776
0 8
$i
Printed edition:
$z
9781137336637
776
0 8
$i
Printed edition:
$z
9781349673759
776
0 8
$i
Printed edition:
$z
9781349673742
830
0
$a
Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy
$3
1256114
856
4 0
$u
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137336644
912
$a
ZDB-2-LCM
912
$a
ZDB-2-SXL
950
$a
Literature, Cultural and Media Studies (SpringerNature-41173)
950
$a
Literature, Cultural and Media Studies (R0) (SpringerNature-43723)
筆 0 讀者評論
多媒體
評論
新增評論
分享你的心得
Export
取書館別
處理中
...
變更密碼[密碼必須為2種組合(英文和數字)及長度為10碼以上]
登入